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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODOCnON 
Within the discipline of political science the specialized 
atudy of totalitarian theory and practice is a relatively recent 
development.! An operating example of a totalitarian movement 
and a totalitarian rule appeared in Italy under Benito Mwaolini*# 
Fascist government. The Nazi Party triumphed in Germany in 1933 
and provided additional raw material for the study of totalitar­
ianism, In Germany, the characteristics of this fona of political 
contTOl emerged and were recognized as being the components of a 
unique political phenomenon. These included the rule of a secret 
police, the utilization of terroristic controls, and the estab­
lishment of concentration camps. An understanding of the essence 
of totalitarianism was further expanded with the developments in 
the Soviet Union and the appearance of mass purges and slave labor 
camps. 
With the expansion of totalitarian rule from Europe to Asia 
and Latin America, political scientists came to the full reali­
zation that this form of government is certainly not confined to 
one particular country or to one continent. It is in essence a 
general phenomenon capable of presenting a challenge to democratic 
l̂ lliam Ebenstein, "The Study of Totalitarianism," World 
Politics, 10 (January, 1958), p. 27b. 
2 
governmental institutions throughout the world.̂  A number of 
leading scholars and journalist# have concluded that this phenom­
enon has spread to the island of Cuba where it has become a working 
system of government under the leadership of Fidel Castro. 
In any study of totalitarian theory and practice, the initial 
step involves the formation of a working basic definition, Zbig-
niew K* Brzesinski provides us with such a definition* 
Totalitarianism is a system in which technologically advanced 
Instruments of political po%mr are wielded without restraint 
by centralized leadership of an elite movement for the pur­
pose of effecting a total social revoltuion including the 
conditioning of amn, on the basis of certain arbitrary 
ideological assumptions proclaimed by the Imdership, in an 
atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.3 
Working from a concentrated definition, it is possible to 
develop a descriptive analysis of what constitutes a totalitarian 
system. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski in their 
Wok Totalitarian Dicta tons hip and Autocracy isolate six traits 
which characterize totalitarian rule. William E. Ebenstein and 
Ivo K. Feierabend present additional elaborations which supiû.em̂ t 
the analysis. Finally, Hannah Arendt provides lui understanding 
of tM psychological motivations and goals of a totalitarian system. 
The combined work of these authors is the creation of a theoretical 
model of the totalitarian state. The purpose of this thesis is 
to utilize this abstract model as a study guide for an analysis 
%bld., p. 275. 
B̂rzezinski, ZtaLgniew, "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics," 
Dictatorship and Totâ tariaaism, ed. Betty Brand Burch (New York: 
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 196k), p. 180. 
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of Castro'# Cuba from the years 
The base of this model is provided by the work of Friedrich 
and Brzezinski. These men have isolated what they refer to as a 
"syndrome" of six traits.̂  The components of this syndrome are 
an official ideology, a single mass party led by one man, terror­
istic police control, a monopoly over communication media and over 
weapons, and a centrally directed economy. 
The authors begin their study by elaborating upon the first 
element within the syndrome, an official ideology. According to 
Friedrich and Brzezinski, an ideology may be defined as "a reason­
ably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to 
reform a society based upon a more or less elaborate criticism of 
what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society,"̂  Sine© 
the totalitarian state is dedicated to total destruction and total 
reconstruction, the totalitarian ideology must accept the concept 
of violence as a legitimate component of its system of belief,̂  
In the totalitarian setting, ideology is an all-encompassing 
doctrine which serves as the guide line and blueprint for every 
facet of the individual's existence. This all-encompassing nature 
is justified in the ideology's promise of the eventual citation of 
kîarl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian 
Dictatojrehip and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I961), 
p. 9. 
Îbid., p. 7h. 
b̂ld. 
k 
an ideal, Utopian society.? 
The second characteristic of the totalitarian state as 
described by Friedrich and Brzesinski is the eKistence of a single 
mass party usually led by one man. The membership of this party 
is composed of an elite hard core which in itself comprises a 
R 
small percent̂ e of the total population. The party provides 
a following for the dictator. Party membens dedicate their 
energy towards the successful fulfillment of party programs and 
g 
through their devotion to duty set an example for the masses,' 
The authors' reference to the individual who leads the single 
mass party is a concept deserving special elaboration. This indiv­
idual, the totalitarian dictator, possesses and exercises a nearly 
absolute power which is unlimited by constitutional restraints. 
The dictator is assisted by political lieutenants and a bureauc­
racy, both of which are completely subject to his control. The 
nature of his leadership is also characterized by a peculiar 
relationship which exists between the leader and his people, a 
relald-onship involving a mythical identification between the two 
in which the leader and the led are considered to be one. The 
totalitarian dictator controls his lieutenants, the bureaucracy, 
and his people by the utilization of propaganda and terror,̂ ® 
7lbld.. p. 9, 
Gibld. 
Îbid.. p. 33. 
10%hid., p. 26. 
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The third component of the descriptive base presented by 
Friedrich and Brzezinski is the existence wiWiin the totalitarian 
1 1 
system of terroristic police control. Terror is the prime 
instrument within the system which is directed toward the achieve­
ment of the totalitarian goal of total change. Challenges to 
the revolutionary goal of rebuilding society cannot be tolerated. 
Opposition is prevented from developing by the utilisation of 
total terror designed to engulf everyone in the society. The 
potential enemy as well as the open enemy must be weeded out and 
destroyed. Since unanimity provides the totalitarian system with 
its greatest element of strength, any deviation within the system 
mist be completely eliminated. 
Building toward an apex of terroristic control is a system 
based upon informers, puises, and public confessions, and it is 
capped with the existence of concentration camps,This struc­
ture of control receives its justification from the totalitarian 
ideology, an ideology considered by totalitarian leaders to possess 
the absolute truth. Deviations and challenges to the ideology 
are illogical and deserve rvthless elimination. Therefore, the 
authors are able to formulate the following conclusion: "The 
I 
total scope of totalitaricr terror and its pervasive and sus­
tained character, operating in an atmoaphere of ideological 
lllbid.. p. 10, 
l̂ ibid., p. 165 
6 
compulsion ) make it a unique feature of modem totalitarianism•"̂ •3 
The fourth trait of the syndrome is the monopoly of control 
exercised by the leadership elite over all effective means of com-
aivmication, including radio, television, motion pictures, books, 
newspapers, and the educational system.̂  These various media 
are utilized as inatruments to transmit propaganda directed towards 
the goal of maintaining the totalitarian system in its position 
of complete control. According to the authors, the propaganda 
is "action-related,Its goal is to motivate the masses to 
perform certain actions or to encourage the non-performance of 
certain other actions. 
Howver, monopolistic control of radio, television, motion 
pictures, and the press produce among the general public a dis­
trust of transmitted information.Therefore, in oMer to trans­
mit revolutionary goals and ideology effectively, the totalitarian 
system must rely heavily upon its control of the educational 
syst®»,̂  ̂ Under totalitarian rule, educational communication 
betwem teacher and pupil becomes a transmission belt of indoc­
trination designed to foster within the youth of the society zeal 
for revolutionary goals and complete loyalty to the totalitarian 
13lbid., p. 138. 
%bid.. p. 10. 
--Ibid,. p. 108. 
l%bid., p. 112. 
^̂ Ibid., p. 118. 
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government. We may conclude that total monopoly of mass ooomnm-
ications is therefore one of the most striking characteristics 
of totalitarian dictatorship»̂ ® 
The fifth element which contributes to the unique nature of 
totalitarian phenomenon involves a monopoly of force, Friedrich 
and Brssezinski categori.z© this fifth characteristic as a weapons 
monopoly whereby all effective means of armed combat are possessed 
by the ruling elite. 
The authors conclude their contribution to the analysis 
of totalitarian systems with their presentation of the sixth 
characteristic trait of totalitarian rule—the central direction 
of the total economic operations of the country. This control 
is performed by a bureaucracy directed by the governing elite 
through centralized state planning operations, operations which 
involve control of industry, labor forces, and agriculture. 
If the totalitarian system is functioning in an underdeveloped 
environment, rapid and immediate industrialization becomes the 
OA 
central objective of the regime. State plmis are enactW by 
state-appointed directors who head each individual factory. 
Labor resources, including men and unions, are transformed into 
instruments and branches of the state machinery.Finally, 
l%bid.. p. 107. 
l%bid., p. 10. 
20lbid., p. 200. 
Zllbld.. p. 212. 
8 
planning is carried to the sister function of industry in the 
economic system, that of agricultural production. Collective 
farms, subject to the regulation and direction of centralized 
state planning, are established,22 Thus, we see that the three 
components of economic production (industry, labor, and agriculture) 
become political instruments of the totalitarian regime and are 
subjected to complete control and direction. 
These are the six basic characteristics which will be 
applied in this thesis to the study of Castro's Cuba, Upon this 
base, further information can be laid to refine the general 
picture of theoretic totalitarianism. The writings of William 
Sbenstein provide such information. 
For example, Ebenstein clarifies the broad definition of 
totalitarianism presented by Brzezinski by stressing the concept 
that the basic purpose of totalitarian rule is the control of 
the individual by the state. According to Sbenstein, "There is 
no area of human activity—political, economic, social, religious, 
or educational—that is exempt from government control and dom­
ination,̂ 23 
In addition, Ebenstein expands the understanding of the 
characteristics of totalitarian regimes by pointing out that the 
intricate components of totalitarian jargon are words used fre­
quently to describe a democratic system of government—party, 
22ibid., p. 229, 
2%illlam Ebenstein, Totalitarianism: New Perspectives (New 
York* Holt, Rinehart, and VJinston, Inc., 1962), p, 6, 
9 
democracy, public approval. Thus the totalitarian leader is 
able to pervert the democratic slogan of government by, of, and 
for the people by dropping the first two elements and building his 
regime upon the proposition that government exists "for the people," 
He maintains the government's right to rule completely while still 
preserving the appeal of democratic terminology.̂  ̂
The third contribution of Sbenstein to our basic understanding 
of the nature of totalitarianism is his explanation of law as it 
exists within such a system. Enveloped in a totalitarian envi-
romnent, concrete rules of jurisprudence governing and protecting 
the individual are not able to survive. Law presupposes authoidty 
existing independently from the ruling elite. The totalitarian 
leader cannot admit such an existence within a system which 
fosters arbitrary arrests and standards of justice based upon 
such vague concepts as the "interests of the state".In a 
totalitarian state, the individual may be held legally responsible 
for his actions whether or not such actions disobeyed an existing 
statute. His offense may be labeled as a political crime and 
within the totalitarian framework such crimes are broadly defined. 
Sbenstein concludes that within the totalitarian system, law is 
designed to protect the government, not the citizen. 
In the creation of an abstract model of the totalitarian 
2^*Ibld.. p. 7. 
25iw., p. 9. 
26ibid. 
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State, Ivo Feierabend further extends and elaborates the base 
provided by Friedrich and Brzezinski and the contributions of 
Ebenstein. Feierabend begins his analysis by stressing the incom­
patibility of a pluralistic society with a totalitarian regime. 
The totalitarian party infiltrates all other groups in the society 
armed with the goal of assuring that it will be the recipient of 
the complete and supreme loyalty of each individual in the society. 
The pluralistic society is replaced with a mass of isolated indi­
viduals whose need for social standards and a sense of belonging 
is satisfied by party membership and ties with the elite,27 
The second contribution of Feierabend is his description and 
analysis of the expansionist and Isolationist tendencies of total­
itarian systems. These seemingly contradictory characteristics 
may be explained through an understanding of the totalitarian 
ideology. This is an ideology which professes to be based upon 
absolute truth. The existence of competing ideologies governing 
the political systems of foreign countries present to the total­
itarian leader an illogical challenge. He is right and they are 
wrong. He is so convinced of the scientific truth which supports 
his cause that he can easily justify aggressive action towards 
these other false systems of belief. Howver, in order to protect 
the purity of his own beliefs, the totalitarian must be isolated 
from the foreign infiltration of false doctrine. According to 
27ivo K, Feierabend, "Expansionist and Isolationists Ten­
dencies of Totalitariam Political Systems," Journal of Politicsj 
2ii (November, 1962), p, 736» 
11 
Feierabend, both imperialism and Isolationism are "necessary 
protective devices without which the totalitarian political 
system would founder,"28 
The final contributor to the basic model which this thesis 
will use as a study guide applicable to Castro's Cuba is Hannah 
Arendt, Arendt's unique contribution lies in the refinement of 
our basic understanding of the purposes of totalitarian terror. 
Arendt conceives of terror as the very essence of the totalitarian 
system of government, a system based upon the organization of 
isolated, "atomized" individuals,̂  ̂ Spy systems, pui%es, the 
secret police, and the establishment of concentration camps are 
the instruments used in isolating the individual. According to 
Arendt, the concentration camps serve as the most outstanding 
illustrative example of the techniques of totalitarian terror. 
These camps were not designed as instruments for the punishment 
of definable, definite crimes. They are designed to isolate 
masses of human beings for the purpose of destroying the moral 
element in human nature and reducing men to an animal status, 
Man minus his moral character is conceived by Arendt as the ideal 
totalitarian citizen,̂ ® 
By combining the works of Friedrich and Brzezinski vith the 
^̂ Ibld.. p. 731. 
^̂ Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (Mew York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951), p. 3l6, 
30lbld,, p. LIB. 
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elaborations of Ebenstein end Felerabend and the refinements of 
Arendt, the theoretical framework of what constitutes a total­
itarian system is complete. This thesis will apply this frame-
w.oric to the political system of Castro's Cuba, utilizing a 
descriptive analysis, the thesis will include a presentation of 
the background and history of the Cuban Revolution, an analysis 
of the beliefs of Fidel Castro, and a study of political, eco­
nomic, and social conditions under the Castro regime. 
The descriptions presented in this thesis are applicable to 
Cuba during the years 1959 to 1961+, In all probability, these 
descriptions do represent a continuing trend. However, the proof 
of such a proposition lies beyond the scope of the thesis which is 
strictly limited to one time period. 
CH&PTEa TWO 
THE BACKGROUND AND STORY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 
On July 26, 1953 at $sl$ in the morning approximately two 
hundred young men participated in an attack on the Moncada 
barracks at Santiago in eastern Cuba«̂  Their unsuccessful 
military operation was inspired and planned by a twenty-six year 
old lawyer named Fidel Castro, These men were motivated by a 
fiery interest in Cuban national politics. Most of them were 
active in radical political movements and several had belonged 
to the reformist Ortodoxo political party,̂  The fruit of the 
attack was a fifjbeen year prison sentence on the Isle of Pines 
for the revolutionary leader and his followers,̂  
The attack on the Moncada barracks represented the first 
direct stage in the military implementation of a revolutionary 
movement. But this stage was preceded by the formation of a 
revolutionary program, a program designed to appeal to the Cuban 
people as a means of securing their open support. The platforms 
%onald M, Schneider, "Five Years of Cuban Revolution," 
Current History, L6 (January, 1961i), p. 27. 
%yatt Maĉ affey and Clifford Bamett, Cuba Its People, Its 
Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962), p, 230, 
Ĉharles !4alamuth, "Fidel Castro—Messiah Who Needs Help," 
Communist Affairs, 1 (February/̂ arch, 1963), p. 20. 
13 
Hi 
of the program espoused by this group of young rebels were pub­
licized in the trial proceedings brought against Castro for his 
role in leading this revolutionary attack against the regime of 
Fulgencio Batista. The base of the revolutionary program was its 
avowed opposition to Batista's dictatorship, a dictatorship 
characterized by tyrannical rule and governmental corruption#̂  
The Castro-led movement was articulated in terms of social justice 
for the underprivileged members of Cuban society through govern­
ment-sponsored programs financed by expanded industrialization»̂  
In general, it may be assumed that the program pKjclaimed 
by Castro in 1953 appealed to Cubans who desired a return to 
constitutional government and to Cubans who wanted social changé 
based upon economic improvements. The program was expressed in 
broad terms which created an implied appeal to Cubans whose 
political beliefs fell in betwemi these extremes.̂  
ùn May 15, 1955» Fidel Castro received a pardon from the 
Batista govenunent, Castro, with his brother, Raul, fled to 
Mexico where he was joined by other Cuban revolutionaries.̂  An 
Arget̂ ne doctor-turned professional revolutionary named Che 
Guevara enlisted in the revolutionary movement and a triumvirate 
Vrank Tannenbaum, "Castro and Social Change," Political Science 
Quarterly, 77 (June, 1962), p. 182. 
Âdolf A. Berle, Jr., "Cuban Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 39 
(October, I960), p. h3» 
%acGaffey and Bamett, p. 232. 
M̂alamuth, p. 20. 
15 
was formed composed of Fidel, Raul, and Che. 
During a two-year period, while men were receiving military 
training for an armed invasion, Fidel made contacts with Cubans 
a 
of the middle and upper classes, enlisting their financial support." 
Finally, the revolutionaries secured a yacht, the "Oranaa" and 
prepared to set sail for the Cuban mainland. The "Granaa", built 
to accommodate eight people, was jammed with eighty-two men in 
9 
addition to weapons and supplies. The group landed on Cuban 
shores and was met by the military might of Batista's armed forces. 
Twelve survivors, including Fidel, ilaul, and Che, escaped to the 
Sierra Maestre Mountains from which they later launched a guerrilla 
10 
war against the thirty thousand man army of Fulgencio Batista. 
For two years and one month, the rebels, who by ndd-1958 
numbered around one thousand men, engaged in a program of guerrilla 
warfare based primarily upon defensive action. Offensive action 
was limited to attacks against small anqy patrols and weakly 
defended police posts. The rebels spent a great deal of their 
energy retreating from major military mgagements since they 
fully realized the impossibility of their succeeding in such 
11 
battles. However, the heroic image projected by Castro and his 
mountain rebel followers was successful in providing psychological 
Îbid.. p. 21, 
9lbld. 
l°Ibid. 
^̂ acGaffey and Barnett, p. 2liO. 
16 
encouragement and inspiration to revolutionary activities throughout 
Cuba.̂  ̂̂ astro presented to the Cuban people a living example of 
a courageous, heroic struggle against dictatorship which strongly 
appealed to the Cuban people, especially the youth.̂ -̂̂ The people 
began to perceive of Castro as the successor to José Marti, the 
martyred hero of the Cuban revolt against Spain in 189$. 
Inspired by the Sierra fiaestre movement, a large urban resis­
tance program developed. Underground cells of the 26th of July 
Movement, the title adopted by the Castro-led rebels, conducted 
terrorist activity, distributed anti-government progaganda, and 
converted Individuals into active participants against the Batista 
regime.Batista reacted by countering revolutionary terror 
with his own terror. The combination of guerrilla warfare and 
indiscriminate government reprisals succeeded in making life 
intolerable for the average Cuban citizen, who in the name of a 
return to normality, began to support, at least passively, a rebel 
victory. 
Combined with active underground support, composed of young 
people and a citizenry which seemed more and more willing to support 
the Castro movement, was a third component of rebel support. This 
backing emanated from the opposition espoused by the several 
existing political parties. These parties were encouraged by 
l̂ ibld., p. 237. 
^̂ Robert Alexander, "Cuba After the lievolution," Mew Leader, 
U2 (January 12, 1959), p. it. 
•̂ •̂ îacGaffey and Bamett, p. 2I4I, 
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Castro's active rebellion and began openly to oppose Batista.̂  
Castro, the rieh lawyer of the upper class» discovered that 
his movement vas receiving si;#port frcm a large national front. 
Professional oz%migâtions of buslnesmen were giving him veH)@l 
st̂ port* The hierarchy of the Catholic Church as well as Protestant 
clergymen were joining In the opposlW.on to Batista* 
However, two elements of Cuban society rmalned aloof from 
the revolutionaiy movwssnt said failed to contribute any direct 
support* TWse were the peasants and the labor forces. Throughout 
the entire period of guerrilla warfare fmm 1957-1958 not a single 
peaswit revolt occurred, This same lack of support was evident 
in the response given to Castro's appeal for a general strike called 
for April 9, 1958# According to Theodore Draper, the failure of 
the strike call illustrated that the revoluti.on'8 support came \ 
fmm the middle and upper clemses of Cuba and not from the lower j 
classes,̂ ® 
On July 20, 1958 Castro initiated steps to formalize the 
active support he was receiving frm organisations within tbm 
Cubmi society. Seven revolutionary groups signed the Camcas 
Pact, the final draft of lAich ims personally dictated by Castro, 
Partido Bevoluclonario Cubana, Partldo del Pueblo CuWmo, Oẑ an-
ization Autentica, Fedemelon Estudiŝ til Universitarla, Mreotorio 
^̂ heodore Draper, Castro*8 Revolution Myths and Realities 
(New York* Frederick A, Prewger, 1962), p, lit, 
%̂bid. 
7̂j«Mes O'Connor, "On Cuban Political Ekoncmy," Political 
Scieme Quarterly, 79 (June, 1961$), p, 236, 
®̂Draper, ifyths and Realities, p. 2, 
18 
Revolucionario, and Directorio Obrero Hevolucionario agreed to 
Support the revolution and to accept the leadership of the 26th 
of July Movement,Communist representatives were not included 
in the pact.̂ O 
The pact was based upon three basic proposed prograras: support 
of an armed insurrection, the establishment of a temporary pro-
vialonal government directed to the restoration of democratic 
principles, and the instituting of a permanent government dedicated 
to the protection of civil rights, freedom and progress,22 
On November $, 1958, Fidel Castro and his troops marched 
from the Sierra Maestre initiating the first steps in a plan 
whereby his and Raul Castro's troops would combine forces to 
converge upon Santiago de Cuba. Che Guevara led an assault 
against Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas province. Santa 
Clara fell on Decmber 31, 1958. The fall of this city convinced 
Batista that the battle was over. Two years and one month had 
elapsed since twelve men had made their way to the Sierra Maestre. 
To the leader of these twelve men, Fidel Castro, Batista aban­
doned Cuba as he and his advisors fled to the Dominican Republic. 
Underground groups supporting Castro seized control of Havana. 
This set off a chain reaction in which other major cities immed­
iately surrendered, Fidel Castro and his bearded followers began 
l^Malamuth, p. 22, 
20MacGaffey and Bamett, p, 2kh» 
22ibid, 
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their victory march to Havana.̂ 3 
Dr. Kami el Urrutia, the first provisional president of Cuba, 
arrived in Havana on January 5, 1959. He removed martial law, 
dissolved the existing Congress, and announced to the Cuban people 
that they would be governed by a provisional cabinet. 
The composition of the cabinet headed by Urrutia reflected 
the combination of the forces which had combined to oppose the 
Batista regime. However, the older Cuban leaders predominated, 
rather than the more youthful rebels.2$ Jose' Miro became Prime 
Minister, Roberto Agramonte, Minister of State, Dr. Lopez Frescuet, 
Minister of Finance, Armando Hart, Minister of Education, Manual 
Ray, Minister of Public Works, Humberto Sori Marin, Minister of 
Agriculture, and Lais Orlando Rodriguez, Minister of Interior.26 
Strikingly, Fidel Castro held no official position in the provi­
sional government until February 13, 1959 when Cardona resigned 
the premiership to be replaced by Castro.̂ 7 
One of the first acts of the Council of Ministers was the 
issuance of The Fundamental Law on February 6, 1959 which consisted 
of a modification of the 19iiO Cuban Constitution. Those sections 
23Robert J. Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution (Hew York: 
MacMlUan Co., 1962), p. 276. 
^̂ "After Dr. Castro's Arrivals Varied Post-Revolutionary Scenes 
in Havana," Illustrated London Hews, 23k (Jauiuary 17,1959), p. 85. 
%̂acGaffey and Bamett, p. 2̂ 7. 
^̂ Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 277. 
27J, p. Horray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1962), p, 13. 
20 
of the Constitution which discussed such basic concerns as Cuban 
culture, labor, property and suffrage rights were incorporated 
into The Fundamental Law without any essential changes. However, 
clauses of the Constitution dealing with the powers of 
government were rewritten and reconstructed so that the power of 
the government would be vested in the Council of Mlnisters.Bo 
The statements and actions of the new government as first 
articulated and performed by members of the provisional government 
appeared to be politically moderate. The new govermient proclaimed 
that Cuba would both accept and respect its international obliga­
tions. Internally, the government would pursue policies directed 
toward economic development and political freedom. Under the 
administration of the provisional government, civil liberties 
were restored. The press was accorded complete freedom in its 
access to information and in its publication rights. Within Cuban 
society, organizational groups were given autonomy in their 
operations. In response to this political climate, exiles began 
to return home,̂  ̂
Tension entered into the political climate when Castro -aoved 
to enact his program of revolutionary justice. While still in 
the Sierra Maestre, he had appealed to the Cuban people, begging 
them not to take justice into their hands in the event of a rebel 
victory. Castro vowed that Batista's lieutenants, accused of 
^̂ MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 2b9. 
29lbid.. p. 21*6. 
21 
crimes involving torture and murder, would be punished, Ath 
the direct support of the mass of Cuban people, cailitary courts 
were established during the first three months of Castro's rule. 
Three-man military tribunals ordered five hundred executions. 
The American press presented these trials as being instruments 
of governmental-directed terror. However, there is very little 
evidence that these trials were not correctly administered as 
accused criminals faced written c bargee based upon convincing 
evidence. In two instances revolutionary justice was perverted. 
In one case, the accused was tried in an atmosphere described by 
R o b e r t  A l e x a n d e r  a s  b e i n g  " a k i n  t o  t h a t  o f  a  l y n c h  m o b , C a s t m  
ordered a retrial for the accused, but the guilty verdict was 
again rendered. The second case involved the trial of a number 
of air force pilots accused of bombing open cities. The tribunal 
found the pilots Innocent, Castro refused to accept this verdict, 
ordered a retrtal, and personally dictated the sentences to be 
imposed upon the defendants, 
These war tribunals were proclaimed by many American jour­
nalists as being the first step initiated by Fidel Castro in the 
transformation of the provisional government into a radical and 
personal system of rule. As the preceding paragraph illustrates, 
this proposition is subject to modification. However, by May, 
1959, Castro did begin to transform the original provisional 
3%lexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 277. 
%bid., p, 279. 
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government. 
During the first nine months of 1959, 1$00 decrees, laws and 
resolutions were enacted by the Castro government.33 The majority 
of these decrees were concerned with social legislation. Between 
July and November 19$9t Castro initiated changes at the top levels 
of government which installed in nearly all governmental posts 
member# of the radical left. The completion of the process can 
best be seen by tracing the careers of the original members of 
the Cuban provisional government. The first president of revo-
lutlonary Cuba, Manuel Urrutia, chose to seek refuge in a foreign 
embassy. Jose Mir̂  Cardona, the first prime minister, is presently 
living among Cuban emigrants in Miami. Of the twelve original 
y 
cabinet ministers, one, Humberto Sori Marin, has been shot, five 
others have gone into exile, and the original minister of public 
works, Manuel Hay, has been actively engaged in counterrevolu-
tionaiy activity against the Castro regime.3̂  
Herbert Matthews presents an explanation of what happened in 
Cuba. The traditional ruling class of Cuba, a conservative, 
right-wing, <appf>r--!Triddle class, was replaced by a radical and 
left-wing regime. The new Cuban regime dedicated itself to pro-
graws which operated to the detrimant-afLiheuipcef levels of 
society. Its programs appealed to the poor, the peasant, the Negro, 
3^MaoOaffey and Bamett, p. 258. 
33o«Connor, p. 2U0. 
3̂ Morray, p. 2. 
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and mulatto, but not to the professional, the bmslnessman, or the 
white elite.32 
J, P. Morray concludes that a second revolution had occurred 
in Cuba whereby the original provisional government and the initial 
revolutionary programs were first modified and then became the 
recipients of basic changes. In the words of Morray: 
. . .the development of the Revolution has carried Cuba 
beyond national independence, beyond patriotism; the Rebel 
Army now defends a Revolution that belongs to a different 
epoch from Maceo and Goaesf and the brooding idealism of 
José Marti no longer satisfies a Cuba he did not forsee. 
Lenin and Fidel Castro have superseded José Martf". 3° 
The following chapters of this thesis will trace and describe 
this process of radiealization by examining the development of 
Castro's personal ideological beliefs and by presenting a detailed 
analysis of political, economic, and social conditions within 
Castro's Cuba. 
^Herbert L. Matthews, Return to Cuba (Stanford, California; 
Institute of Hispanic American an(i Luso-Brazilian Studies at 
Stanford University, 196U), p. 3 
3%orray, p. 2 
CHAPTER Tsmma 
FIDEL CA8TaD--THB MAN AND HIS aE&IBFS 
From Galicla in Northern Spain a young immigrant came to 
Cuba and began his career as a laborer. At the culmination of 
sixty years of work, this man had succeeded in building an estate 
valued at $$,000,000.1 In 1927 a son was bom to this man. The 
boy was named Fidel.̂  
Fidel Castro was reared on a sugar plantation. His father 
and mother provided him with his first immediate contact of the 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. His parents con­
trolled their Negro cmie choppers through a systm: of strict dis­
cipline implemented by gun law,3 An understanding of such an 
environment enables us to comprehend more fully the description 
of young Castro related to Herbert Matthews by a neighbor of the 
Castro family who described Castro as a "wild, husky, unruly 
youngster, 
Castro received his basic education in the Catholic schools 
of Cuba, He attended the famous Jesuit secondary school, Colegio 
iMalamuth, p. 16. 
Âlexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 268, 
M̂alamuth, p, 16, 
%bid. 
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de Dolores, in Santiago de Cuba.̂  Hi* fellow students remember 
him as a boy possessed with the desire to «in, to dominate, and 
always to prove himself to be stronger than his contemporaries. 
The result of this driving ene]%y and ambition were reflected in 
his outstanding success in the fields of athletics and *cademlo 
subjects.̂  
However, intertwined with this desire to excel was a fiery 
temperament which sometimes colored his academic career. For 
example, at the age of sixteen, Fidel lost an argument with a 
teacher. After storming from the school, Fidel returned with a 
pistol determined to shoot the teacher. The forewarned instructor 
had already fled.? 
At the completion of his secondary education, Castix) entered 
the University of Havana where he prepared for a career as a 
lawyer. While at the university, Fidel developed his talents as 
an orator, giving long speeches to his fellow students. His 
political interests were diverted from national Cuban affairs to 
an active interest in student government. In 19hS, he began a 
campaign for vice-president of the law school student body. Castro 
successfully courted the support of various student groups, 
including the campus communists. Once elected, Castro deserted 
his former communist supporters and began a militant campaign 
5Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 268. 
M̂alamuth, p. 16. 
?Ibid., p. 17. 
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against them* 
This interest and participation in campus affairs was 
basically a superficial reflection of Castro's main interest— 
Cuban national politics, i-iis outward expression of criticism 
directed toward the existing government resulted in the Havana 
police considering Fidel to be a dangerous character.̂  However, 
this interest in politics was not for Castro an end in itself, 
Castro, even as a student, considered the value of the political 
system to lay in political instruments to be used for social 
development. The Castro sisters quote Castro in a conversation 
with his father: 
I m in the university studying law and this same 
study of the law makes me defend what is right—even 
with naked hands. I defend the rights of the oppressed 
poor against those who abuse the power they wrench from 
the people with deceitful promises. That is my battle.10 
In October, 1950, Fidel Castro graduated from the University 
of Havana Law School with a Doctor of Laws Degree. He then joined 
a Havana law firm where he devoted his legal talents towards the 
defense of the poorer classes of Cuban society. He often repre- // 
11 
sented these people without receiving any fee for his services. 
Castro coupled his legal career with an active participation 
in politics. He joined and became prominent in the radical 
%bid. 
%bid. 
lOïbld. 
^̂ IMd., p. 18. 
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Ortodoxo Party, By 1952 he was the head of the party's organization 
in Havana.12 Combining hie legal function and party beliefs, 
Castro filed a brief in 1952 before the Court of Constitutional 
Guarantees in Havana. The brief presented an argument that 
Batista's assumption of power violated the 19L0 Cuban Consti­
tution. Castro demanded that Batista be charged with unconsti­
tutional activity.13 
This legal attempt to crush the Batista dictatorship failed. 
Several young Cuban men decided to utilize more radical methods 
to undermine and eventually overthrow the Batista dictatorship, 
Fidel Castro accepted the leadership of this movement. The group 
crystalized their movement into direct action as they engineered 
and carried out a military attack against the Moncada barracks 
in Santiago in 1953» 
Fidel Castro was brought to trial, charged with treason by 
the Batista regime. It is possible to trace the development of 
Castro's political philosophy by using his defense speech at his 
trial as a starting point. This political philosophy was clarified, 
modified, and expanded during a period dating from 1953, through 
the two years of guerrilla warfare, and finally, into the period 
fron 1959, when Castro accepted the reigns of direct political 
leadership. 
The 1953 trial occurred in the city of Santiago de Cuba, 
l̂ Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p, 269. 
l%alarauth, p. 19. 
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The husky, bearded defendant presented his own defense in a 
speech which lasted for four hoars. This speech received sparse 
coverage both inside Cuba and abroad, let within the context 
of the speech lay the skeleton of a plan for transforming the 
Cuban nation.Ik 
Castro began the speech by defending his attack on the 
Honcada barracks. This defense was based on Article LO of the 
I9L0 Constitution. This article guarantees the right of the 
individual to rebel against tyranny. Castro claimed that his 
military actions were legal since they directed towards the 
uprooting of tyranny in Cuba,̂  ̂
Flrom this introductory proposition, Castro developed his 
speech into a discussion of his political philosophy. He expressed 
his belief in se democratic system of government based upon repre-
I 
sentative government and directed towards the protection of civil 
rights.Castro declared that the first law enacted by a Cuban 
revolutionary government under his direction would be a law 
restoring the 19U0 Constitution.̂ "̂  The speech also contained 
allusions to a government empowered by popular election. 
In "History Will Absolve He," the title under which this 
%̂lexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 267. 
^̂ MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 231. 
%bid., p. 232. 
^̂ Theodore Draper, "Castro's Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?", 
Encounter, 160 (March, I961), p. 10. 
l̂ ibid. 
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defense speech was later published, Castro espoused his economic 
beliefs. He unleashed a vigorous attack against what he referred 
to as "vested interests" within Cuba and promised to rectify the 
existing system of economic injustice through revolution and 
centralized power.^^ The Castro social program was proclaimed 
in the following words: 
The problems concerning land, the problem of indua-
trlaJdzation, the problem of housing, the problem of 
unemployment, the problem of education, and the problem 
of the health of the people; these are the six problems 
we would take immediate steps to resolve, together with 
the restoration of public liberties and political democracy.̂  
In this section of the speech, Castro also implied that the 
economy must be subject to strict government control and regu­
lation, He charged that the selfish profit motivation had been 
protected at the expense of the common welfare.The government 
should initiate programs by which grants of land wjuld be dis­
tributed to peasants. Under government encouragment, agricultural 
cooperatives would be established as a method of sharing the cost 
and use of expensive equipment. Government involvement in the 
economy would also include the nationalization of electric and 
22 telephone companies. 
The contents of the speech did not frighten middle class 
l̂ MaoGaffey and Barnett, p. 232. 
ZOlbid., p. 233. 
21lbid. 
Ẑ Draper, "Castro's Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?», p. 11. 
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Cubans, Castro promised Indemnification to the property owners 
affected by proposed revolutionary pro&rams. Again and a^aln in 
the speech, Castro referred to Jose Marti, the Cuban martyr who 
died in the name of freedom and independence, Castro quoted a 
wide range of political philosophers frow AcqulnlG to Montesquieu, 
Buji not once did Castro quote Marx, Engels, Lenin, or St̂ in̂  ̂A 
Middle class Cubans could feel relatively reassured from this 
speech. 
The years which Castro spent in the Sierra Kaestre waging a 
guerrilla war contributed the next step in the clarifying of his 
beliefs. In the Sierra Kaestre, the city-bred Castro came into 
direct contact with the Cuban peasants. He found them to be poor, 
uneducated, many suffering fro a diseased bodies and living in 
primitive conditions. The humanitarian nature of Castro was 
genuinely touched by their plight. He became determined to 
initiate programs which would improve the living conditions of 
this Cuban class, 
After two years of war, the fcbela achieved victory. By 
February, 1959, Fidel Castro was personally directing the Cuban 
political system. At this time, the statements of goals and 
ideals issued by Castro contained a philosophy which appeared 
appealingly attractive to liberals throughout the world. In the 
words of Castro} 
2%alamuth, p. 19, 
draper, "Castro's Cuba: A Revolution Betrayed?", p. 9, 
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Standing between the two political and economic 
ideologies or positions being debated in the world, we 
are holding our own position. We have named it humanisa, 
because its methods are humanistic, because we want to 
rid man of all fears, directives, or dogmatism. We are 
revolutionizing society without binding or terrorizing 
it. The tremendous problem faced by the world is that 
it has been placed in a position where it must choose 
between capitalism, which starves people, and communism, 
which resolves economic problems, but suppresses the 
liberties so greatly cherished by man. ^th Cubatœ and 
Latin Americans cherish and foster a revolution that may 
meet their material needs without sacrificing their liber­
ties. Should we accomplish this by democratic means, 
the Cuban Revolution will become a classic example in 
the history of the world.25 
In the first weeks of the revolutionary victory, Castro 
consistently defined his program as "humanism." He refused to 
associate himself or his program with any other definite political 
tag.26 He denied that he favored socialization or nationalization 
of private property. As to his own political future within the 
new revolutionary government, Castro told reporters on February 
28, 1959, that since elections would be held within two years, he 
expected to be the Prime Minister of Cuba for only a short time.27 
Purthennore, in a speech delivered by Castro on May 8, 1959 
in the Plaza Civica, Havana, Castro declared that his revolution 
was not associated with the communists. 
Then why do we say that our Revolution is not Communist? 
Why, when we prove that our ideals are different; from Com­
munist doctrine, that the Revolution is not Comnànist or 
^̂ Sam Bottone, "Cuba: Socialist or Totalitarian?", Mew 
Politics. 1 (Fall, 1961), p. 25, 
2%acGaffey and Barnett, p. 258. 
2%orray, p. 21. 
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capitalist, that it is a revolution of its own . . « that it 
has Its own ideology—entirely its own--which has a Cuban 
basis and is entirely Cuban, entirely Latin American, why 
thm, do they start to accuse our Sevolution of being some­
thing it is not? . . .28 
This description may be considered as the first form of 
political philosophy espoused by Castro. A transformation of 
this original form appeared at the end of 1959^ a transformation 
involving a shift to the left. Fidel Castro was accepting the 
support offered to his government by the Cuban communist party. 
For example, Castro appeared on television end denounced President 
Manuel Urrutia. According to Castro, Urrutia's strong pronounce­
ments against communism were not compatible with a system of 
government based upon the support of several revolutionary groups, 
the communists included,Urrutia fled into exile. 
On Mayfl, I960, Fidel Castro delivered a speech in which he 
presented his definition of the true democracy. He did not mention 
elections. 
That democracy has asserted itself directly in the 
intimate union and identification of the government with the 
people, in this direct dealing, in this determination to 
do things and to strive for the good of the great majority, 
in the interest of the great majority of the covmtry.̂ O 
On May 1, 1961, Fidel proclaimed Cuba to be a "Socialist 
People's Republic."̂  On December 20, 1961, in a five-hour 
28paul E. Sigraund, ed. The Ideologies of the Developing 
Mations (New Yoxkt Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 262, 
^̂ Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 282, 
%̂igmund, p. 296. 
33-Alexander, p. 286. 
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television monologue, Castro declared his conversion to Marxiasi-
L©ninism,32 Castro appeared to have crossed the line. He was 
doing more than protecting the oommuni#te. He was now espousing 
their philosophy and declaring this philosophy to be his own. 
The depth of the atatemmt, "I am a llarxist-Leninist'', was especially 
evident in an interview in the February issue of L'Uni ta» the 
ItaliMk communist official paper. In Castro's word** 
It [The Popular Socialist Party] is the only Cuban 
party that has clearly proclaimed the necessity for a 
radical change of structure, of social relationships. It 
is also true that at first the Communists distrusted me 
and us rebels. It was a justified mistrust, an absolutely 
correct position, ideologically and politically. Th® 
Communists are right to be distrustful because we, the 
Sierra leaders of the guerrillas, were still full of 
petty bourgeois prejudices and defects, despite Marxist 
readings.33 
Castro's conversion to Marxism-Leninism was interpreted in 
several ways. To some, his "I am a Marxist-Leninist" speech 
marked the official crossing over from a revolutionary socialist 
position to a complete acceptance of communist philosophy. Others 
conceived of the speech as only an official confirmation of the 
philosophy which had motivated Castro before as well as after the 
revolution. Those who accepted this second interpretation claimed 
that Castro always was a Commmist. Fidel Castro personally 
described the process involved in his conversion in an interview 
with Herbert Matthews of the Wew Yoric Times. Matthews quotes 
32Theodore Draper, "Castro's New Communists," New Leader, 
(April 16, 1962), p. k. 
33Bottone, p. 26. 
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Castro? 
With my ideas and my temperament, even in my school 
and university day#, I could not be a capitalist, a democrat, 
a liberal. I always had it in me to be a radical, a revo­
lutionary, a reformer, and through that instinctive prepa- . 
ration it was very easy for me to move into Marxism-Leninism. ̂  
In the course of the interview, Castro consistently denied 
that he had officially belonged to the communist party either 
during his student days or during the early revolutionary period. 
He r̂ ated to Matthews that during his third year at the Univer­
sity of Havana, he had read and been impressed by Marxist litera­
ture, But this was purely an intellectual inspiration which did 
not evolve into membership in the communist party or an official 
acceptance of Marxist philosophy. 
Castro explained to Matthews that at the time of the attack 
on Moncada barracks, he was not a Maiziet revolutionary. He 
desired a radical revolution within Cuba, but he felt that such 
a revolutionary progz%m could be enacted under the 19W Cuban 
Constitution and within a democratic system of government.3̂  
In summation of this interview, it is possible to conclude 
that Castro had a predisposition for Marxism. But he did not 
fully accept the Marxist line until well after the revolutionary 
process had started. Castro conceived of his conversion as being, 
in his OWÎ words; 
3^Matthews, Return to Cuba, p. 11. 
3%bld. 
3%bld. 
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. . • a gradual process, a dynamic process in which the 
pressure of events forced me to accept Marxism as the 
answer to what I was seeking.37 
In accepting and espousing a philosophy of Marxim-Leninism, 
Castro was in fact aligning himself with the official Communist 
Party of Cuba, the PSP. Why did he make this choice? Castro 
did this because his own 26th of July Movement lacked an official 
organization. Its greatest weakness lay in its heterogeneous 
nature of support. Within the ranks of the 26th of July could 
be found both Cuba's rich and poor. Between the interests of 
these two groups existed a steep chasm. The revolutionary leaders 
leaned toward the poorer elements of Cuban society. This alienated 
the upper classes who began to believe that the 26th of July Move­
ment had been tumW into an active instrument and weapon which 
would be used against th®B, Therefore, instead of providing 
Castro with a unified body to Implement his program, the 26th 
of July presented him with a conflicting membership, unable to 
agree on a revolutionary program. 
On the other hand, the Cuban communists could supply Castro 
with a rationale and oî anized support of his position as the 
lider raaximo. The party offered a coherent program which was in 
essence similar to Castro's desired goals. Finally, the PSP 
possessed a structure of organization which could be utilized in 
the molding of the Cuban population into a unified corps of 
^̂ Ibid. 
36 
•̂ 6 
revolutioaary supporters. With the full acceptance of Marxism-
Lenlnlsm, the Castro regime claimed possession of a "scientific" 
sanction for the expansion and unlimited use of the state power 
in the name of social change. The joining of the Fidel Castro 
movement with the communist party of Cuba produced a regime which 
possessed an Ideology, a set of definable revolutionary goals, 
and a blueprint for enacting those goals.3̂  
After reaching this stage in the study of the development 
of Castro's political philosophy, it becomes necessary to inves­
tigate the relationship which existed between Castro and the Cuban 
communist party. From I960 to 1962, the PSP exercised a great 
deal of independent power within Castro's political system. Its 
influence was felt in the formation of new revolutionary groups 
such as youth and women's groups and in the reorganization of 
existing Cuban associations such as the Cuban labor unions. 
However, in 1962 Castro decided that the party was going too far. 
On March 26, 1962, Castro delivered a three-and-one half 
hour television speech in which he denounced the leader of the 
Culmn communist party, Anlbal Escalante and the control which 
Escalante was attempting to exercise in Guba.̂ ® According to 
Castro, party members were usurping control in factories and in 
3%acGaffey and Barnett, p. 252, 
^̂ Alfred Sherman, "Cuba: Communist CaudilHsmo," The 
Spectator, 209 (September lit, 1962), p. 359» 
%̂raper, "Castro's New Communists,* p. L, 
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other organizations. Castro related that it had become impossible 
for even a Cabinet minister to discharge an official duty without 
interference from the communist party. An angry Mdel Castro 
continued by reporting that several hundred rebel army officers 
had come to bim personally complaining that they were no longer 
commanding troops because their political beliefs were not 
approved by the communist party,̂  
Castro blamed Escalante for the existing, unsatisfactory 
conditions. Therefore, the speech could be interpreted as only 
a personal attack against one man and not against the system he 
represented, Castro did not refer to policy questions in the 
speech. He paid homage to the past service of the communists to 
the regime and enlisted their continued support. However, he 
asked them to remmber that those who accused him of creating a 
cult of personality around himself should be reminded that "we 
[the Castro-led rebels] waged a war, we led it, we won it."̂  
The March 26th speech attacked one communist, but not 
coramwîist philosopher. However, the speech reflected Castro's 
recognition that his revolution was slipping out of his control. 
This he would not tolerate. He had established himself as the 
% 
lider. He and he alone would be the authorized interpretor of 
Marxism-Leninisa in Cuba, Communism in Cuba would be communism 
%bid, 
Îbid.. p. 5. 
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directed by Fidel Castro.̂  ̂
In order to correlate this description of Castro's beliefs 
with our theoretical model, it is necessary to determine if these 
beliefs correspond with Friedrich and Brzezinski's description 
of the totalitarian ideology which they define as "a reasonably 
coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to 
reform a society based upon a more or less elaborate criticism 
of what is wrong with the existing or antecedent society,"̂  
The communist ideology gave to Castro a well rounded program 
upon which he could build his own proposals for the refort of 
Cuban society. But Castro's acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist 
label did not place him in a straight-jacket. The revolution 
still depended upon Fidel Castro, an unpredictable, uncontrollable, 
and anarchic individual. It may be concluded that he accepted a 
label and an organizational blueprint from the communist ideology. 
But the details of revolutionary programs would be Castro's own 
creations, reflecting his own judgment. 
We have traced the development of the governing beliefs of 
Fidel Castro and have seen this development lead from a program 
described by Castro as "humanism" to an acceptance of Marxist-
leninism, In the succeeding chapter, an analysis and a description 
of the functioning of the Castro government, the government of the 
lider maxLmo, within the political system of Cuba will be undertaken. 
3̂ibid., p. 7, 
F̂riedrich and Brzezinskl, p, 7U 
CHÀPrm FOUR 
CUBA'S POLITICAL STSTm UNDER CASTRO 
The traditionally oriented student of political science would 
approach the Cuban political system armed with a theoretical study 
outline which would designate three areas of investigationî the 
executive, the judicial, and the legislative institutions of 
government. The student would find that the instruments of 
executive power are dominated by one man assisted by a group of 
young, loyal lieutenants. Institutionalized power has been 
superseded and replaced by a system of personalized government. 
When attention is turned to a study of the judicial branch of 
government, the student is confronted with a system of justice 
which derives its existence from the ruling elite. Lacking 
independence, the judicial system operates in an atmosphere of a 
controlled society. Finally, in place of a representative legis­
lative branch, the student faces a void, created by the non-exis-
tence of a national representative body. Within this realm, his 
study must center upon mass rallies, the psychological connection 
between the leader and the people, and a study of the regime's 
ideological attitude concerning elections. 
Prom raid-1959 to 19̂  the Castro government operated through 
an executive ccwaiittee or directorate of six men composed of Fidel 
Castro, Raul Castro, Che Guevara, President Dorticos, Bias Roca, 
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Smillo Aragonea Navarro. It was within this group that the policy 
decisions of the government were formulated, A Cabinet of ffinisters 
also comprised a part of the executive system. However, this 
group served an administrative function and was not involved in 
direct policy-making. The role of the Cabinet was further limited 
by the fact that each Cabinet member was responsible to Castro 
alone. Below the Cabinet of Ministers were all the organizations 
that administered the specialized agencies of the government. 
Included among these organizations were the army and police, the 
national political party, and the agencies devoted to economic 
control. 
Within this oî anizational framework, Fidel Castro remained 
the Jefe Maximo, the aH-powerfiil leader. He dominated the govern­
ment, the army, and the party organization, Castro was Prime 
Minister of the government, CoTsirnander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
and Secretary-General of the country's single political party,̂  
He was assisted by a group of young men wW *rere completely loyal 
to him and dedicated to the revolution. 
Ridel Castro utilized the reins of executive power in a 
manner and with a style which colors and enlivens any political 
analysis of executive power. He worked in a disorganized manner. 
His rigorous daily schedule included impromptu visits anywhere 
on the island. He personally supervised government projects. He 
M̂atthews, Return to Cuba, p, 6. 
%îacOaffey and Bamett, p, 27b. 
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explained government programs to the people by talking to individual 
humble citizens whom he met on his daily outings, k further 
example of these impromptu appearances were his unannounced visits 
to the University of Havana where he engaged in give-and-take 
"bull" sessions with the students.̂  Castro formalized this 
contact with the people through his frequent televized speeches.̂  
The examination of Castro exercising executive power must 
also include a special study devoted to the speech-making technique 
of this leader. Castro's frequent television speeches wazrant 
special attention since they represent in themselves a governing 
technique. Castro possesses a unique speaking ability. He 
utilized a sense of rhythm and voice pitch to build his speeches 
according to a definite pattern and in so doing created an effect 
comparable to the recitation of a long poem.̂  Grahmn Greene 
expounded upon the contents of these speeches. Greene described 
the speeches as possessing a sense of "a man thinking aloud. 
Castro, according to Greene, explained government programs, 
admitted government mistakes, and described the difficulties he 
and his lieutenants were f£U3ing, He did this in a style which 
"̂Cuba Paints Its Own Shade of Bed," Business Week, (June 13, 
I96L), p. 1*8. 
Âlexander, Prophets of the Revolution, p. 278. 
^Elizabeth Sutherland, "Cubsuis' Faith in Castro," Manchester 
Guardian #ekly, 85 (December 7, 1961), p. 2. 
%raham Greene, "Return to Cuba," New Republic, 11*9 (July-
December, 1963), p. 17. 
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reflected a deep respect for the intelligence of tds listeners* 
The success of Castro's leadership technique was reflected 
in the genuine affection and admiration which was awarded him by 
the Cuban people, especially those of the lower classes. In both 
his actions and his speeches, Castro appeared to be completely 
dedicated to the welfare of the people and his people were the 
poor. He endeavored to give them a sense of human dignity. The 
poorer classes of Cuba found in Fidel Castro a new folk hero to 
replace Marti, The foundation of Castro's authority was the 
people's perception of his "heroism, wisdom, and sanctity,*® 
The poor of Cuba worshiped the young leader. In many of their 
homes, his picture was hung next to that of Christ's.̂  
A theoretical understanding of Castro's system of personalized 
government can be formulated by examining Frank Tannenbau®'s 
explanation of why such a form of government was able to exist 
in Cuba. Tannenbaum finds the answer to this question within a 
study of the psychological forces which govern the individual 
Cuban's political attitudes, attitudes which revolve around the 
concept of the "caudlllo." 
To the Cuban, the caudillo possesses all powers of government. 
The leader is expected to do everything personally which is 
7lbld. 
Ĥerbert Matthews, "The Cuban Revolution," Hispanic American 
Report, 13 (August, I960), p. 6. 
Êchwrard Friedman and Richard Kraus, "The Two Sides of Castro's 
Cuba," Dissent, 8 (1961), p. 58» 
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required in the operation of a government. Such a govemment is 
personal and intimate. Therefore, the poorest of citizens will 
attempt to take his problems directly to the President, the great 
man who possesses the remedy for every ill. The leader and his 
people are one. They do not need elections, nor do they need a 
legislative branch of government to represent them. The caudillo 
is the personification of all govemment,̂ ® In Guba, Fidel Castro 
was the caudillo. 
To complete the study •>f executive political power in Cuba, 
it is necessary to describe two members of Castro's executive 
staff, men who exercised a great influence over the Cuban caudillo. 
The first of these, Fidel's younger brother, Raul, was noted for 
being extremely radical, vJliile attending the University of Havana, 
he belonged to the Soviet Youth, the young people's branch of the 
Cuban communiât party, Aa a reward for his active participation 
in the oinanimation, Raul was sent as a Cuban delegate to the 
Communist World Youth Conference held in Prague in 1953. He 
returned to Cuba the same year laden with Communist propaganda 
which he attempted to distribute in Cuba,̂  ̂ Raul assisted his 
brother at Moncada, followed him to Mexico, and fought with him 
in the Sierra Maestre. He occupied a key position in the Cuban 
governmental structure through his membership on the Directorate, 
However, he was not personally popular with the Cuban people 
^̂ Tannenbauffl, pp. I8U-I86, 
î̂acGaffey and Banaett, p. 21*0, 
and would never be able to take his brother's place» 
The second individual who greatly influenced Fidel Castro 
was Che Guevara, Guevara, thirty-seven years old, was bom in 
Aî entina where he studied medicine at the University of Buenos 
Aires. He was involved in anti-Peronist activities in Argentina, 
He left Argentina to join the Castro forces in Mexico,According 
to Theodore Draper, Guevara possessed the best trained Marxist 
mind of those close to Fidel,He served Castro as an economic 
advisor from his position on the Directorate, However, his place 
within the governmental structure was given to him by Fidel, As 
a foreigner, Guevara was not popular with the people; therefore, 
he owed his power to his friendship with Fidel, 
This was the picture which can be traced of the executive 
branch of government within Castro's Cuba, It does not represent 
a fulfillment of the promises made by Fidel Castro in 1953 or in 
19$9. These promises Involved the establishment of an executive 
authority empowered by popular elections. Therefore, the study 
of executive powers in Cuba must include a description of the 
regime's modification amd final nullification of these pnmlses. 
There have been three steps involved in the development of 
Castro's attitude towards elections. First, he promised them. 
This step occurred in the early formation and publication of a 
l̂ Ibid, 
^̂ Theodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," Reporter, 22 
(Hay 12, I960), p. 16. 
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revolutionary program and government. Then Castro claimed that 
elections were not immediately feasible. Finally, he began to 
ridicule elections.̂  The last two steps may be effectively 
illustrated by quoting from Castro's speeches. 
îforray presents a quote from a speech which Fidel Castro 
made on April 9, I960. This quote aptly illustrates a sharp 
turn from revolutionary promises that elections would be held 
within a few months after the provisional government had restored 
oMer, 
It is necessary to put an end to poverty, to consolidate 
the wo lie of the Revolution, before holding elections.̂ 5 
In a later speech, Gastm promised that, 
. . . elections would be held when the Agrarian Reform had 
been completed, when everyone had a job, when all could 
read and write, when all cMMren had free schools, and 
all had access to hospitals,̂ " 
Implicit in these quotes is the belief that the revolutionary 
program would be hampered by elections. Castro was directing a 
process which involved the complete rebuilding of Cuban society. 
Elections would only serve as an interference for his direct 
action. In a four-hour interview with a Brazilian newsman Caystro 
stated; 
. . elections are a myth. The parliam«ntary system in 
Cuba reflected the old system, which we are now destroying. 
D̂raper, "Castro's Cuba - A Revolution Betrayed?", p. iS 
%̂orray, p. 29. 
^̂ Ibid. 
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Election® now would be a step backwards, with time and 
effort wasted in sterile discussions and theoretical 
considérationo.̂ 7 
A complete turn in Castro's attitude towards elections was 
illustrated in a speech given by Castro after the May 1* I960 
Labor holiday celebration in the Plaza CÉvica in Havana, In this 
speech, Castro attacked the election process. He stated that 
"direct democracy, as practiced in Cuba was a thousand times 
purer than these false democracies that use all the means of 
18 
corruption and fraud to betray the true will of the people."^ 
The acceptance by the Cuban people of this philosophy is 
depicted in an interview conducted by Richard Hudson. "'Elections,' 
moaned a woman. 'We had seventy years of elections and all the 
politicians did was deceive and rob us. We do not need elections. 
We have Fidel.'"19 
When Castro referred to "direct democracy," to what was he 
referring? He was describing the mass meetinga which he personally 
attended to explain governmental programs and to hear the roaring 
stamp of approval from the assembled crowds. The ballot box was 
replaced by voting "with machetes aloft,These mass meetings 
were also a phenomenon deserving of special discussion since they 
l7«E3.ection8 Are a Myth," Time, 75 (April U, I960), p, 35, 
Hispanic American Report, 13 (July, 19̂ ), p. 307, 
^̂ Richard Hudson, "As the Cubans See Castro," Saturday Review, 
h7 (October 10, 196U), p. 97. 
2®Friedsian and Kraus, p, 58* 
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possessed characteristics distinctively Cuban. For these B̂ etings 
were not comparable to the staged, mad frenzies of the Naad or 
Fascist movements, Graham Greene attended such a meeting on July 
26, 1963 where, in front of the monument to Marti in Havana, Castro 
delivered a three-hour speech, Greene found the assembled crowd 
to be composed of cheerful people with an air of being on a 
holiday enveloping them» Some stayed for the three hours. Others 
listened for awhile and then moved on. Then others took their 
places. This was Castro's direct democracy. 
The next area to be considered in the study of Cuba's 
political system is the judicial branch of government. Within 
Castro's Culm, the legal system presented a unique picture. 
The first purge of the Cuban Supreme Court by the revolu-
tionajy government was enacted by the provisional government's 
first president, Manuel Urrutia, This was a purge directed toward 
the elimination of Batista-appointed judges. At that time, the 
Supreme Court was composed of forty justices. Thirty-six were 
dismissed, to be replaced by judges appointed by President Uirutia. 
This newly-appointed Supreme Court then purged the lower ranks, 
22 
removing approximately twenty per cent of the national bench. 
The second purge of the national bench was initiated by the 
Castro-directed government in late I960 following the resignation 
of President Urrutia. On December 26, I960, the Castro adndnistration 
BlOreene, p. 17. 
^̂ Morray, p. 16. 
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passed a decree officially dlemisslng seventeen Supreme Court 
justices. The number of judge# on the Supreme Court was officially 
reduced to fifteen marabers. The Castro government justified this 
action by openly declaring that the old judiciary was oompomed of 
too many judges whose philosophy was not completely dedicated to 
the revolutionary cause* The government was not satisfied with 
the decisions in eight past cases, decisions which reflected an 
anti-revolutionary attitude.̂ 3 As a reaction to this decision, 
the president of the Supreme Court, Dr. Emilio Menindea fled 
into exile. Court vacancies were then filled by appointees who 
received Castro's personal approval.There was no judicial 
independence in Castro's Cuba. 
The administration of justice within Castro's Cuba from I960 
to 19̂  is a subject which presents a contradictory set of inter­
pretations involving the legal treatment of political prisoners, 
Ref 1:̂ 668 from Cuba submitted written complaints to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American 
States, Responding to these complaints, the Commission published 
two reports: one concerned with the legal situation of political 
prisoners in Cuba and the other dealing with general questions of 
human rights in Castro's Cuba, The Commission sent forty-eight 
notes to Castro containing one hundred and twelve complaints. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, II4 (February, 1961), p. 88I, 
2%anuel lîrrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro and Co,» Inc, (New York: 
Frederick A, Praeger, 196U;, p. 165. 
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The Castro government replied to twelve. 
Complaints presented to the Commission declared that persons 
charged with political crimes were tried by spécial tribunals 
composed of men belonging to the militia or to the arqy, Thersfore, 
thee# tribunals acted ae an administrative arm of the government 
instead of functioning as an Independent judiciary. Prisoner* 
were forced to appear before these courts without being granted 
sufficient time to confer with a lawyer in order to prepare a 
defense,Furthermore, justice administered by these tribunals 
often involved an issuance of the death penalty sentence, a sen­
tence based upon evidence presented in many cases by a single 
individual.^? Those accused of counterrevolutionary activity 
charged they had been deprived of the rights of bail, habeas 
pO 
corpus, and the right to appeal the decision of the tribunals. 
The Conmission was also presented with complaints that 
prisoners charged with political crimes received punishments, the 
forms of which serve as an affront to the concept of an individual 
possessing certain basic rights, regardless of him crime. An 
example of this unjust treatment which was sanctioned by the Cuban 
legal system was presented in the statement of a former magistrate 
^̂ Inter-American Commission on Human Right, Report on the 
Situation of Political Prisoners and Their Relatives in Cuba 
OEA/Ser 7.7) Doc h (English) (m.l.l-E 6693}, p. 1. 
26ibid.. p. 16. 
^̂ Ibid.. p. 18. 
28lbid., p. 3. 
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of a Cuban court who had fled to Illaai: 
La Cabala is a centuries old Spanish fortress. It 
abounds with dark, undeî round dungeons and uninliabitable 
cells, which are now used for political prisons .... 
There, in this filthy, underground hole the prlsonere 
remain for days, without sun, light, or ventilation, 
A former political prisoner described his imprisonaent in one 
of Castro's prisons. 
The only openings that room had were two holes the 
size of a man's eye, through which they watched me day 
and night. They did not let me sleep. There was a very 
strong light that made the room an oven, I was naked. 
The interrogations were endless,30 
The complaints also chained that convicted political pris­
oners were sent to concentration camps located in remote, rural 
areas of Cuba, Here the prisoners were Inflicted with physical 
p\mishment and subject to forced participation in labor gangs.̂  
To substantiate these charges, the complaints listed two locations 
of known concentration camps; one was supposedly located in the 
Las Villas in the district of Manicaragua; the other was located 
in Gayo Largo.3^ 
The Commission formulated a final conclusion which its members 
had deduced from the submitted written complaints: 
From the contents of the documentation presented to 
the Commission, it appears that the procedure known as mental 
psychological torture has been employed in the political 
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prisons. This consists in destroying the moral fiber of 
the prisoner by means of a series of tactics including 
exhausting interrogations, complete isolation, false and 
alarming news, threats to the prisoner and his family, 
and acts of terror,33 
In evaluating the reports issued by the Oonraissiou, it 
beoomea mecessazy to consider the source of the charges. T!ie 
complaints came from middle and upper class Cubans who had fled 
to î'îiaisi. These people left their country because of dissatis­
faction with a revolutionary program directed towards the imple­
mentation of programs of social improvements. These programs 
benefited the poorer classes of Cuban society at the expense of 
other classes. It must be remembered that emigres from Cutei are 
members of the upper-#iddle classes. It is these people who 
would benefit by a return of their position should the Castro 
regime fall in Cuba, 
An evaluation of these reports should also include a recog­
nition of the guerrilla record of Castro and his rebels. During 
the war waged in the Sierra îîaestre, the rebels possessed an out­
standing record for their treatment of prisoners. There is 
absolutely no evidence of maltreatment. Their conduct towards 
captured soldiers earned them a great deal of sympathy in Batista's 
own army ranks.^ 
In addition, the Castro regime was subjected to charges of 
33lbid,, p. U, 
3%aurioe Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cubat Tragedy in Our 
Hemisphere (New ïorkt Grove Press Inc., 1903), p. 66. 
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administrating distorted justice in the revolutionary tribunals 
which tried Batista supporters* Yet subsequent writings by 
Zeitlin, Scheer, Draper, and Matthews revealed that these trials 
were with few exceptions conducted in a fit manner. The arrested 
person was charged with a specific crime in writing. He had an 
immediate right to contact a lawyer. The defendant was tried 
before a three man board, one member of which was a lawyer. Each 
defendant possessed the right to appeal his verdict within twenty-
four hours to a Supreme Court of Military Justice composed of five 
members,35 
The court appearance of the prisoners captured in the April, 
1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion also presents a modification to the 
treatment descidbed in the CoOTission's reports. A total of 
1,179 prisoners were tried in the Castillo del Principe prison 
in Havana before a five-man military court. The defendants' 
condition as they appeared in court reflected the reception of 
good treatment. They appeared to be clean, healthy, and well fed 
after two months of detention in Cuba, The proceedings which 
followed in the court room were orderly. According to Cuban law, 
the invaders could be subject to the death penalty. let not one 
was sentenced to death.̂  
From the proceeding description, it is possible to conclude 
one concrete fact. The Cuban judicial system and legal codes from 
3^Ibid., p. 6$. 
3%i8panic American Report, 1$ (Jvme, 1962), p. 316. 
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1959 to 1964 were subject to the will of the ruling regime. An 
independent judiciary did not exist in Cuba, However, as to the 
administration of justice, including the punishment delivered to 
conviceted prisoners, the conflicting reports and prejudiced 
sources limit the ability to present a clear, accurate picture. 
The next area to be considered in the study of the political 
system is the role of political parties within the governmental 
framework. In the case of Cuba, this study is intricately con­
nected with the role played by the Popular Socialist Party, the 
communist party of Cuba. 
From all indications, Castro in 1959 was not an active member 
of the Cuban communist party. In fact, at the beginning of the 
revolutionary movement, the Cuban communists made public their 
opposition to both Castro and his movement. In turn, Castro did 
not include the communist party among signers of the Pact of 
Caracas. With the growing number of Castro supporters, the com­
munist line of opposition to Castro shifted. A communist repre­
sentative was sent to the Sierra Maestre in 1958 to form an 
alliance with Castro. The communist party then ordered its members 
to give full support to the revolution by joining the guerrilla 
forces and by participating in urban terrorist activity. 
At the completion of the victorious revolt, Castro, accepting 
the reins of government, began to initiate a revolutionaiy program 
37ltonald M. Schneider, "Five Years of Cuban Revolution," 
Current IHLstory, ii6 (January, 196L), p. 28. 
which in its content of social change alienated most of his middle 
and upper class supporters» His style of governing which evolved 
into personalized rule alienated members of the 26th of July Move­
ment who had fought against one-man rule. Therefore, the 26th of 
July wasnot organized by Fidel into a working political party.^ 
Castro did not trust the other parties which had signed the Pact 
of Caracas since he felt that they represented too conservative a 
view» There was no native revolutionary party present to offer 
a program which could effectively challenge the communist party» 
The ccmnunist party reacted to the initiated revolutionary program 
by giving it its full support. 
The Popular Socialist Party, headed by Bias xioca, Juan Marlnello, 
and Anlbal Escalante, all old-time Stalinist-following communists, 
were able to offer Castro an organization and an ideology.By 
July, i960, the PSP was the only functioning political party in 
Cuba. The power of the PSP was seen in its government-sanctioned 
control over newly created revolutionary associations of young 
people, women, and civic groups.̂  But this was a power which 
y 
was still subject to the control of the lider who effectively 
challenged Escalante in 1962, Fidel used the communists. They 
3®Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution» p. 383. 
%̂chneider, p. 28. 
%̂heodore Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," Reporter, 22 
(May 12, I960), p. 18. 
M̂acGaffey and Barnett, p. 260. 
did not succeed in controlling him. 
Since the Cuban communist party maintained very close con­
nections with the Soviet Union, it becomes necessary to determine 
if Castro's economic and military dependence upon the USSR served 
to strengthen the Cuban communist party and to inhibit Castro's 
political power, Castro did not conceive of his economic depen­
dence upon the Soviet bloc as being coœpaî ble to Cuba's previous 
economic domination by the United States. For example, the 
Russians brought Cuban sugar, but they did not own Cuban planta­
tions or sugar mills.̂  
Furthermore, the Cuban missile crisis exemplified the nature 
of the relationship which existed between Moscow and Havana, In 
an interview with Herbert Matthew, Fidel Castro declared several 
times that it was his idea to place missiles in Cuba, not the 
Russians,After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro believed that 
he needed missiles as a deterrent to any future attack on a laî er 
scale than the invasion had been. Fidel claimed that he convinced 
the Russians of this need. 
In order to repair the damage caused by their highhanded 
treatment of Fidel during the crisis, the Russians invited Castro 
to the Soviet Union, The Soviet leaders accorded him a reception 
as no other foreign visitor had ever received in Russia,̂  The 
^̂ Matthew, Return to Cuba, p. 12, 
%̂bid,, p, 15. 
Îbid., p. 12, 
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Russians seemed to realize fully that they were dealing with a 
national leader who possessed an independent mind. According to 
Herbert Matthews, "When the Russians want to influence Fidel they 
cannot huff and puff like the wind; they must bathe him in sun-
shine,"̂  ̂
In 1961, Castro announced the formation of a new political 
party, the Integrated Revolutionary Oî aniaations (ORI). This 
party constituted an alliance between the communist party, the 
remaining elaaents of the 26th of July Movement, and the Direc-
terio Revolucionario, a student group which actively opposed 
Batista.031 was established to fulfill the need of a well-
organized political instrument to support the programs of the 
Castro regime» Each of the major Cuban govemment agencies and 
ainistides had its counterpart in ORI. The leading officials 
in ORI were Carlos Rodriguez, Anibal Escalante, and Fabio Grobart, 
all old-time communists.̂  ̂ It soon became obvious to Castro that 
PSP influence in ORI was too extensive. The Castro revolution 
was being confiscated by the PSP, Castro effectively challenged 
the PS? and secured the downfall of Escalante, Then Castro 
annoimced that 081 would be replaced by a new party organization. 
The new party was named the Partido Unificado de 1# Revolucion 
Socialists de Cuba (PURSC), In I96U, branches of the party were 
5̂lbld., p. 12, 
%̂raper, «Castro's fîew Communists," p. 3, 
7̂lhid.. p. 18. 
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in existence on the local, municipal, and provincial levels of 
Cuba, On the national level, the party was directed by the M.rec-
ci6n Macional, composed of twenty-five persons. It was Castro's 
announced goal that the PUHSC would embrace all organisations which 
espoused loyalty to the revolution, including youth groups, the 
military, and trade unions. The PS? was incorporated into the 
new party. But within the structure of the FURSG, it was only 
one element and certainly not the controlling element,̂  
By Januajy, 196U, the new party had accepted 2$,000 Cubans 
into its membership, a membership which was eventually expected 
to grow to 35»000. Individuals who desired party membership had 
to meet three qualifications: the candidate must be a first-rate 
worker, he must belong to a defense organization, and he must 
have participated in some of the government sponsored courses in 
li9 
self-improvement « 
PURSC did not govern since it was not granted administrative 
powers. It was the desire of the Castro Mgime to have the party 
serve as an intermediary between the government and the people at 
every level. Party members were expected to direct their energies 
towards the fulfillment of government projects. It was members 
of PURSC who served as effective volunteers in Cuba's time of 
emergency as hurricane Flora hit Cuba's shores. But it w&s to 
be clearly understood that PURSC was an instrument of the government. 
%̂atthews. Return to Cuba, p. ?. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 16 (January, I96h), p. 1055. 
S8 
It did not control the government. In fact, there was no require-
Pient that government officials and even members of the Cabinet 
belong.This was the stnictiire and purpose 3f Castrons single-
party organization. 
The executive, judicial, and party system composed thé 
Cuban political system as it operated within Cuba between 19$9 
to 196k. However, the Ideological motivations of the Castro regime 
have led to an involvement in international politics. The Castro 
regime accepted and expounded a philosophy of expansionism based 
upon a belief in the purity and coirectness of its own political 
system. Castro strongly desired the rebuilding of every country 
in Latin America according to the blueprint of the revolutionary 
Cuban government. On July 26, 1960 at a public speech, Castro 
said, "If they want to accuse us of wanting a revolution in all 
America , . . let them accuse us."̂  ̂ The Castro government sponaared 
programs which brought hundred of Latin American students and 
leaders to Cuba where they received indoctrination and training 
aimed at developing them Into guerrilla fighters who can effec-
tfo 
tively overthrow their home governments.̂  Cuban embassies in 
Latin America openly engaged in subversive activity against 
existing governments. They distributed printed laaterial throughout 
5%atthews, Return to Cuba, p. 7. 
S., Department of State, Cuba (Inter-American Series, 
1961), p. 2$. 
^̂ Ibld.. p. 22. 
Latin American countries, including Guevara's manual on guerrilla 
warfare. During 1959, the Castro government supported unsuccesafal 
armed invasions to Panaussa, Nicaragua, the Dominican Hepablic, smd 
Haiti.In 1963, an attempted plot led by Cubans to overthrow 
the government of Venezuela was uncovered and successfully pre­
vented by that coimtry's government.̂  As a result of these 
actions, seven American states broke diplomatic relations with 
Cuba.̂  ̂
This completes the study of the model of the Cuban political 
system under the Castro regime. We may conclude that Cuba from 
1959 to 1961* was governed by a personalized system of government 
which utilized a controlled judicial system and a single party to 
initiate and accomplish its programs, programs which were carried 
beyond the boundaries of Cuba to other countries of Latin America. 
How do these conditions correspond to our theoretical model? 
Within the poUW-cal system of Castro's Cuba were found two 
elements which correspond to the descriptions presented by Fried-
rich and Briezinski, The leadership exercised by Fidel Castro was 
characterized by the existence of one dominating political figure 
who exercised absolute power# Furthermore, the PUESC, Cuba's 
single mass party, is illustrative of Friedrich's and Brzezinski's 
S3lhld.. p. 27. 
Cuba's Brazen Blueprint for Subversion," Reader's Digest, 
(August, 1965), p. 67. 
S., Department of State, Cuba, p. 29. 
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theoretical iswdel of the totalitarian state. 
The transformation by the Castro regime of Cuba's judicial 
system into a direct instrument of political power is illustra­
tive of Ebenstein's description of law within a totalitarian 
syst®®. Judges in Cuba were held responsible to the Premier who 
expected them to perform their functions in accordance with his 
revolutionary programs. In addition, the list of charges pressnted 
to the Inter-American Commission concerning the treatment of 
political prisoners within Cuba's legal system represents an 
example of operational terror as described by Hannah Arendt. 
Finally, the Castro regime's interference with the opera­
tions of independent government of Latin America corresponds to 
the expansionist tendencies described by Ivo Feierabend. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CUBAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM UmgR THE CASTRO REGIME 
In analyzing the Cuban economic eystem this thesis will 
describe fovx components—industry, agriculture, the flow of 
capital within the system, and labor. An individual!zed analysis 
of each of these components #ill contribute to a broad under­
standing of the process of the production and distribution of 
goods within a society. Purthemore, since politics is the study 
of wlK> gets what, where, and when, this analysis will involve the 
question of the relationship between the political and econmie 
systems within the society being analyzed. The essential question 
which must be answered in the study of any economic system is 
that of control of planning. Where on the economic continuum 
between complete individualistic capitalisa and complete govern­
ment direction does Cuba lie? From this perspective, we will 
begin a study of the Cuban economic system under the Castro 
regime, concentrating first upon industrial production. 
In 1959 the victorious rebels faced an economic challenge, 
the challenge of an economic systan generally acknowle%ed to 
be structurally unsound, Cuba possessed an economy which «rats 
dominated by the production of one crop, sugar. This was a 
cnop which was sold on a fluctuating market, which provided only 
seasonal employment for the Cuban agricultural worker, and which 
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was sold primarily to one country, the United States, 
This description represents the export side of the Cuban 
economic coin, Th# import side of the coin also presented a 
challenge. Cuban imports far exceeded exports. Cuba, whose 
greatest source of wealth is her rich soil, depended on imports 
for foodstuffs. As with her exports, the imports involved a 
depmdence upon one country, the United States.̂  
Castro and his economic advisors believed that a partial 
remedy for these economic ills lay in a program emphasizing indus­
trialization. Since sixty per cent of Cuba's industrial production 
was controlled by American business interests, Castro believed 
his first task to be the liberation of this sector of economic 
production.̂  From June I960 to February 1961, the Castro govera-
fflent expropriated all foreign companies. A program of nationali­
zation vas then extended to include aU public services such as 
public uidlities and even banking institutions. Govenment take­
over finally culminated in the naM.onali zation of principal Cuban 
companies whose sdzs and resources made them of value to the 
govenment.̂  
D̂udley Seers, "Introduction," in Cuba, The Econoadc and 
SocicOL Revolution, ed, by Dudly Seers (North Carolina; "̂ he 
University of Worth Carolina Press, 196&), p. 19. 
2john Serassi, "What Is Castroism*8 Appeal," New Republic, 
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and Social Revolution, ed. by Dudly Seers (North Carolina: the 
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Castro's Cuba was confronted with the unsolved problem of 
initiating accelerated industrial development. The regime believed 
that this problem could be solved by utilizing the approach of 
a centrally planned econongr.̂  To Implement this planning a 
Ministry of Industry was created to administer industrial produc­
tion, Furthermore, from among the array of Castro's advisors, 
one of his key men was ohoeen to head the ministry, Che Guevara.̂  
The Ministry of Industry was composed of five vice-ministers, 
each of whom was responsible for one aspect of industrial produc­
tion. These divisions were: basic industry, light industry, 
economy, industrial construction, and technical development.̂  An 
o]%anlnational plmi was foimdated which provided for the operation 
of the ministry through six provincial offices,̂  
The complexity involved in organizing a controlled system of 
industrial preductlon was illustrated by the further breakdown 
of oî aniaatlon below the pjrovinoial offices. All of the state 
companies which were involved with the production of similar pro­
ducts were grouped together into empresaa consolidas (consolidated 
enterpriLses).® These groupings facilitated the administration of 
these companies. 
%bld., p. 285. 
Îbid., p. 298. 
%bld., p. 299. 
7lbld.. p. 300. 
Gibld.. p. 301. 
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Revolutionary goals and ideals became intricate components 
in the operations of the Cuban nationalized industries. Salaries 
within Individual companies were equalized. The factory admin­
istra tor made only as much as the skilled laborer, Cosmunal 
incentives were stressed by condemning private self-interest motl-
vationa.9 Profits were nationalized»10 The state-owned companies 
deposited their profits from the sale of products into the General 
State Fund, the title of the government's account in the Cuban 
n 
national bank. 
The Ministry of Industry, the eapresas consolidas, and the 
controlled operations of individual factories by state appointed 
managers comprised the instruments of government regulation of 
industrial production. These instruments were topped by a Central 
Planning Board (JUCEPLAK) which coordinated, organized, and for­
mulated general economic goals and programs. 
JUCEPLAN was given the responsibility of preparing long 
range economic plans, modeled on those developed by the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.This central planning 
council was composed of the prime minister, the ministers of 
defense, finance, public works, economy, the president of the 
national bank, the chief administrator of the agrarian reform 
Ŝeers, p. 6, 
l%acOaffey and Bamett, p, 271, 
llNolff, p. 30ii. 
^̂ Seera, p. U6, 
6  ̂
program, and Guevara, ôîinister of Industry.This planning 
agency operated on a national level. 
However, economic planning must reach the regional and local 
levels, too, A coordinating agency. Junta de Coordinacion (JUCEI) 
was established and given the responsibility of establishing 
units on the provincial level to serve as an intermediary between 
the national planning board and regional units of produoticm,^ 
The national and regional planning agencies were assigned 
the overwhelming task of formulating and implementing a complete 
economic program involving several complex components, A pro­
duction plan had to be formulated, stipulating what products the 
consolidated enterprises would produce. Problems of supply had 
to be solved at the planning stage. The cost of products as well 
as the wages of workers had to be determined. Finally, planning 
involved the determination of production expenses including invest-
ment costs, ̂  
This elaborate system of organizational control operated and 
administrated Cuban industrial production. Ninety-five per cent 
of Cuban industrial output came from government-owned factorles.̂  ̂
The Castro government became involved with the production of 
electricity, textiles, shoes, hardware, basic metals, chemical 
13MacGaffey and Bamett, p. 276, 
^̂ liispanlc American Report, lit (August, 1961), p. 500, 
l̂ Nolff, p. 305. 
p. 296. 
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products, and the refining of petroleum and sugar. 7̂ 
Castro and his economic planners faced their moment of truth 
in 1?63. Centralized Industrial production was not reaping profits. 
Concrete results sharply contradicted the formulated theoretical 
econo-oic plans, Economic failures were clearly illustrated as 
Cuba faced its financial trade deficit. The communist world was 
? 
exporting $1,600,000,CKX) worth of goods to Cuba, yet Cuban ship­
ments to the bloc equaled about $it00,000,cx)0. Therefore, Soviet 
money was being used to finance a trade gap,^® The Cuban plans 
for expanded industrialization had not successfully matured. 
What had happened to turn expected profits into actual losses? 
The answer to this question is composed of various elements. 
Within a period of only two years, Cuba's industrial system had 
been completely transformed from a capitalistic type of production 
to a system of highly centralized government planning. The revo­
lutionary government faced the challenge of first preventing the 
paralyzation of existing industrial production and then maintaining 
and eventually raising production levels. The regime prepared 
an organizational plan on paper. But the implementation of this 
plan often failed. ComMunieatlons between ministries and produc­
tion units was often bogged down.̂  ̂ The formation of 
^̂ rUspanlc American Reportj l5 (February, 1963), p, 1101*. 
®̂Edwin M, Martin, "Cuba, Latin America, and Gommunlm," 
The Department of State Itolletin, it? (October lii, 1963), p. $75. 
l%eers, p. 50. 
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production plans *as ccaplicated by the lack of reliable statistics 
upon which to base such plans.20 These problems were capped by 
the fact that a large part of Cuba's adad.nistrative and technical 
personnel, members of the middle and upper classes who disagreed 
with revolutionary programs, tmd fled into exile.The vacancies 
left by their emigration were often filled with administrators 
whose qualifications were political and not technical. 
Added to administrative difficulties were mechanical diffi­
culties. The regime attempted to replace the worn parts of 
American-made machinery with Soviet-produced parts, an attempt 
which succeeded in wrecking the American equipment. The only 
alternative left to Cuba's economic planners v&a to replace Amer­
ican machinery with Soviet machinery. Thus extensive Mounts of 
capital uhj oh was needed to expand industry had to be used to 
prevent ctmplete paralyzatlon of production. 
Burdened with these problms, Castro visited the Soviet 
Union at the end of April, 1963. Castro was very impressed with 
Soviet economic plans. Upon returning to Cuba, be delivered a 
speech on June 1* in which he compared the Soviet and Cuban 
economic systems. "In Russia," he said, "everyone is dedicated 
%bld., p. 1*9. 
D̂raper, Myths and Realities, p. 130. 
22seers, p. 
^̂ Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Castro's Choice," Spectator, 210 
(March 22, 1963), p. 3U5. 
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to the economy id.th such seriousness that a Cuban visitor feels 
a little ashamed of his own people's attitude.He added: 
The Cubans are somewhat idealistic revolutionaries 
who agitate a great deal and mobilize a great deal but 
build all that in the air without realizing that every­
thing must have an absolutely fundamental basis in the 
economy.25 
When Castro referred to "idealistic revolutionaries" whose 
idealism was not always economically sound, we may assume that 
the regime was at least Indirectly admitting that its industrial 
stress wasoverdone. In Moscow, Castro agreed that Cuba would 
develop its economy through specialization, emphasizing agricul­
tural production,The aim of the economic program became to 
reduce, but not to eliminate, the effort to industrialize and to 
27 concentrate upon agricultural piwiuction, especially sugar. 
This change of emphasis within Cuban economic planning leads to 
the next area of economic study, the second component of an 
economic system, agricultural production. 
The stuĉ  of Cuban agriculture within the Castro regime 
involves the concentration upon one government ministry, the 
Institute Nacional de la Reform Agraria (IMA). Using this 
agency as the focal point of investigation, the analysis of Cuban 
2%heodore Draper, "Castro, Khrushchev, and Mao," Reporter, 
29 (August 15, 1963), p. 29, 
^̂ Ibld. 
%bid. 
^̂ Matthews. Return to Cuba, p. 6. 
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agricultural production may be expanded to include a study of 
land distribution, collective farming, and state-operated faras. 
In 1959 the regime attempted to formulate an agricultural 
program. The government faced a system of agricultural produc­
tion dominated by the production of a single crop, augar# From 
1929 to 19$9t Cuban agriculture failed to adjust itself to a 
sugar market which periodically declined and very slowly recovered. 
Some diversification was attempted to balance these shifting 
scales in market conditions, but this diversification had not 
been extensive enough. Therefore, agriculture profits continued 
28 
to depend upon the production of sugar. 
The cultivation of sugar creates internal problems within 
Cuban society. The sugar harvest requires seasonal labor. There­
fore, a vast number of Cuba's agricultural labor force was left 
unemployed for msuiy months during the year. Furtheraore, the 
cultivation of sugar requires large tracts of land if a sugar 
plantation is to be run efficiently. The result of this require­
ment was the uneven distribution of land ownership, leaving a 
majority of peasants landless. 
The Castro regime faced these problems by establishing the 
Institute Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA). Agricultural 
planning was formulated and implemented in the towering headquarters 
Andre6 Bianchi, "Agriculture," in Cuba, The Economic and 
Social Revolution, ed. by Dudly Seers (North Carolina, the Univer-
sity of North Carolina Presss I96L), p. 98. 
29lbid., p. 99. 
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of IMM located in the capital city. The agency was headed by 
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a leading Cuban communist for more than 
thirty years.He operated an agency which included departments 
concerned with land, production, trade affairs, agricultural 
machinery, and agricultural credit. From Havana, proposed programa 
of IMRA were initiated throî h twenty-eight agricultural zones. 
Within each zone, an IMM delegate was installed under the title 
of Chief of Zone,̂  ̂
This description represented the proposed structure of 
agricultural control. It becomes very easy to utilize this 
description in forming an image of a very efficient, rigidly 
controlled operation. However, a visit to both INRÂ headquarters 
as well as to the various agricultural zones serves as a modi­
fication to this image, 
Karl E, Meyer describes a correspondent's visit to the national 
headquarters of INRi, The correspondent was greeted by a sign 
over a functionary's desk stating, "Be Brief, We Are Fifty Years 
Behind,While the correspondent was conducting his interview, 
r' 
a messenger from Cuba's national bank arrived to pick up a check 
for $100,000, No one could find the check. A cluttered desk 
was ransaked and finally the check was found. Before the corres­
pondent could continue, a school teacher entered the headquarters 
3%atthews. Return to Cuba, p. 5. 
^̂ Bianchi, p, 105. 
32Karl E. Meyer, "Castro's Cuba," Progressive 2k (May, I960), p. 
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carrying a paper bag filled with coins. The teacher explained 
that his pupils had contributed the coins for agrarian reform. 
All work in the office was halted, With due ceremony, the bag 
was placed on the director's desk and everyone in the office 
commenced counting,̂ 3 
The authority granted to the chiefs of Bone colors any image 
we may have of an organized pyramid of control operating from the 
top downwards. Each chief was expected to accept responsibility, 
to see what had to be done and to do it on his own initiative, 
Each chief was granted broad authority in all matters relating to 
economic and social development in his area. Funds were placed 
at his disposal by the national office of I-IRA and the chiefs 
were given considerable leeway in determining how these funds 
were to be spent, 
Of course, lîJHA headquarters kept contact with these zone 
chiefs. It assigned provincial delegates whose authority extended 
over several zones. Coordination was maintained through periodic 
meetings in Havana attended by the directors of INRA's national 
headquarters, the provincial supervisors, and the zone delegates.36 
INM, under Castro's direction, initiated, organized, and 
implemented the first program of agrarian reform in 1959. 
33ibld. 
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According to this program, which warn formalized in the First Law 
of Agrarian Reform, landboldlnga were limited to a maximum of 
3,^00 acres for oattle, eugar, and rice, and 90G acrea for other 
uses. However, under no oircnmetances could a private indi­
vidual own more than l,3b2 acres. Privately owned land lAlcb 
exceeded the law's limitations would be expropriated. According 
to this law, owners of this land would receive compensation. They 
would be paid in twenty-year bonds at an annual interest rate 
of U.5 per cent. The value of the land would be determined by 
the evaluation of the land according to the taxes paid on the 
land. 
It proves to be very interesting to investigate the actual 
operations of IHHA in the process of expropriating landholdings. 
According to Theodore Draper, a representative of INBA, accom­
panied by two armed soldiers, presented himself at a privately 
owned farm whose boundaries exceeded the limits set by the govern­
ment, The delegate announced that the government was taking all 
but a certain portion of the land. Although the stipulations of 
the Agrarian Reform law did not include farm machinery or live­
stock, these too were often appropriated. The delegate then set 
a price for the confiscated land. If the owner accepted the price, 
he was paid immediately in cash. If he did not accept the price, 
his land was still appropriated and he was left without recourse 
37Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17, 
^Gsianohl, p. 101. 
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to appeal. The entire operation was carried on in a very on-
business-like manner. The government delegate made no inven­
tories, The landowner received no receipt. The government bonds 
39 
mentioned in the Agrarian Reform Act were not issued,-̂  
The government disposed of the expropriated land in two ways. 
The first manner involved the granting of this land to private 
individuals. Renters, share-croppers, and squatters were given 
first priority in receiving this government land, a grant of 
26,6 hectares. However, the second manner of disposing of the 
land received governmental preference. This was the program of 
distributing land to agricultural cooperatives.̂ 0 INRA was 
Instructed by the regime to promote cooperative farms whenever 
possible. These cooperatives were placed under the control of 
IWRft who appointed managers for each cooperative farm and supplied 
credit.Coordination was established by giving the cooperative 
managers the responsibility of correlating their programs with the 
zone chiefs. 
Each cooperative cost the Cuban government $100,000, which 
was utilized to provide capital, machinery, and fertilizers. It 
was expected that the cooperatives would pay this investment 
back to the INRA, Beyond this, surplus profits would be plowed 
3?Draper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17, 
(tOBianchi, p. 102. 
i&Ibld. 
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back into the cooperative. The workers built their new houses and 
schools with their own hands with technical aid and raw materials 
provided by the state.̂  ̂ All produce was to be turned over to 
INHA which then marketed it.^b Wages were determined by dividing 
the money made by the cooperatives equally among the workers. 
The organizational pattern of control within each cooperative 
involved the manager and a general assembly of the workers. The 
manager was appointed by the state as lîiHA's official representa­
tive, The farmers of the cooperative met in a general assembly 
once each year to elect a directing board to represent them in 
the making of administrative decisions affecting the cooperative. 
This seven-man board accepted responsibility for production, 
supplies, education, machinery, housing, and personnel involved 
in cooperative living, 
The government was vitally concerned with the choice of 
crops to be grown on the cooperatives. Sugar cooperatives were 
created. However, the government placed special emphasis upon 
the development of crop diversification. Cane fields were 
uprooted and the Cubans were encouraged to grow such crops as 
tobacco, coffee, and peanuts. The regime felt that with govern­
ment encouragement agricultural production could be liberated 
from the chains of monoculture* 
3̂«Guba in mid-Revolution," Economist 198 (January 1, 1961), p 
WtDraper, "The Runaway Revolution," p. 17, 
^̂ Bianchi, p, 109, 
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From 1959 to 1961 the cooperatives functioned as an integral 
component of agricultural production in Cuba. However, in 1961 
the cooperative form of farm organ!wtlon began to be assailed 
by the regime. Why? 
The organizational blueprint for organizing and managing 
the cooperatives was not successful. Adequate accounting systems 
had not been utilized by the cooperatives. Statistical records 
were not available to aid in the formation of agricultural plans, 
Furthermore, the regime charged the cooperatives with exploiting 
nonmexmbers hired at harvest time. According to INRA, cooperative 
managers had contributed to the general failure by not performing 
their jobs efficiently and effectively. The list of charges also 
included the accusation that the cooperatives had engaged in the 
black marketing of scarce produce.̂ 7 
In the final analysis, the regime decided that the coopera­
tive system of organization was not capable of providing a strong 
base for economic growth. Therefore, a new plan was formulated 
stressing agricultural production organized according to the 
Soviet model of state farms. Two hundred and sixty state farms 
were create in 1961. The regime cloaked this change over in an 
ideological justification. The state farm system would better 
serve revolutionary justice since workers would receive equal 
pay for equal work. This method of payment far surpassed the 
U6ibid., p, 122. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 1$ (October, 1962), p, 106, 
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cooperative method of dividing the pî fits among the workers. 
The regime declared that the cooperative method was unfair since 
profits depended upon land productivity, which varied. The 
injustice would be corrected through worker employment on state 
farme,̂  Within a short period of time, these state farms were 
employing over 100,000 workers. The farms were run by managers 
appointed by INHA, By 1962 special departments concerned with 
the administration of state farms were established in the regional 
offices of INRA.̂  The government had become the largest employer 
of farm labor in Cuba. 
With the establishment of state farms, however, agricultural 
reappraisal was far from over. Three years after the agrarian 
reform was officially started, total farm output had fallen below 
the level of the years before the revolution. Again the regime 
had to face the problem of answering the question, why? INBA 
was still crippled in formulating production plans by the lack of 
statistics. Since equijgment maintenance programs had not been 
utilized, farm machinery had deteriorated and the regime could not 
secure new parts. Finally, the managers of the state farms were 
often young and inexperienced and had made too many planning 
mistakes. The end result of these combined conditions was the 
creating of a low productivity level. In 1962 reappraisal began 
again, IMRA began to stress the need of keeping accounting 
^̂ Bianchi, p. 123. 
%bid., p. 12b. 
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records, managers were replaced, and finally, IHRâ decided that 
the Cuban economy was not ready for the strains of crop diversi­
fication, Sugar would again receive the emphasis of agricultural 
planning.50 
The regime coupled its program of state farms with the for­
mation of the National Association of Small Farmers (AHAP), This 
association represented a concession on the part of the agricul­
tural planners to the private sector of the farm economy,̂  The 
association was charged by INRA. to encourage the small farmer 
to direct his production according to IMM programs.Never­
theless, the law recognized the existence of the private sector 
of agricultural production. 
The free landholder in Cuba was restricted by certain 
government regulations. He was allowed by the regime to market 
one-fourth of his produce privately if he was able to transport 
and market the goods himself.5% However, these 200,000 small 
farmens had to sell the remaining three-fourths of their crop 
to the government at fixed prices. They received their supplies 
from INRA country stores. The government owned about one thousand 
of these stores, which were operated according to policies which 
%bid.. p. 11:2. 
^Ibld.. p. 122. 
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fostered underselling to drive all competitive stores from the 
market. 
However, the small farmer received a personal guarantee of 
the protection of hia existence from the lider. According to 
Castro, the small private farmer would not be pushed out by 
large-scale state agriculture. He promised that the proportion 
of state land to small farms would be stabilized at between sixty 
to seventy per cent state land to thirty to forty per cent small 
farms. 
This promise was formalized in the Second Agrarian Reform 
Law. The provisions of this law stated that the ratio of state 
owned land to that owned by small farmers would be seventy per 
cent state to thirty per cent private. In addition, the law 
provided for the nationalization of land holding of over 33 1/3 
acres. The owners of expropriated land which had been cultivated 
would receive an indemnity of fifteen pesos monthly per acre of 
land. The owners of unused land would receive no compensation. 
This law was aimed at destroying medium landholdings. But in 
essence, its provisions did protect the small farmer whose 
original title to 33 1/3 acres had been given him by the govern­
ment. 
By the end of 1962, IKRA was formulating agricultural programs 
^̂ Manchi, p, 126. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 16 (October, 1963), p, 765, 
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based upon a stress on sugar production. The government created 
a National Sugar Commission with boards at the provincial levels. 
Members of these boards represented the Ministry of Industries, 
INRà, MAP, and the anions of agricultural and sugar workers. 
The Commission and the boaMs were to work together to promote 
coordination between all government bodies involved in sugar 
production. 
By early 1963 the government was espousing the following 
slogans 
The highest honor to the martyrs of the 26th of 
July is to arrive at July 26 with all our cane fields 
free of weeds.58 
The Castro regime faced the revolutionary challenge of 
converting a capitalistic system of agricultural production into 
a socialist type. The methods of the transformation involved 
two Agrarian Reform Laws, the expropriation of lands, the estab­
lishment of cooperatives, their conversion into state farms, and 
finally, a mild form of encouragement to small farmers. 
To complete the analysis of the industrial and agricultural 
sectors of the Cuban economy, it is necessary to describe the 
government's role in directing and controlling the flow of 
capital within and between these sectors. This is a two sided 
coin involving the flow of small as well as large amounts of 
money through the economy. The first side of the coin, the flow 
57aianohl, p. Ib7. 
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of small amounts of money, Involves a description of the govern­
ment's control over both wages and prices. Government programs 
of social improvement created a situation in which the average 
Cuban had more money to spend. Redaction of unemployment, lowering 
of rents and prices, and the establishment of a minimum wage brought 
about an increase in the demand for goods. The Cuban had money 
to spends therefore, larger amounts of small capital should 
have begun circulating through the economy. However, a compli­
cation arose which greatly colored the situation. The failure 
of proposed industrial plans created a shortage of consumer goods. 
Through the success of government programs, the Cuban had money 
to spend. But because of the failure of other government economic 
programs, he had little to spend it on,̂  ̂
In investigating the second side of the coin, the flow of 
large amounts of capital, we become concerned with the area of 
Investment capital. In this area, Cuba's revolutionary government 
was deeply involved. The principle source of financing capital 
Investment within Cuba was the National Treasury, which utilized 
a nationalized banking system. Industrial and agricultural profits 
and foreign loans were deposited in the National Treasury and 
then distributed as needed in the economy. From this source 
came the funds which were used to maintain as well as to expand 
industrial and agricultural production,̂  
S&Nolff, p, 320, 
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Industry and agriculture are two components of Cuba's 
economic system. The third component is labor, including men 
and their organization into unions and the relationship which 
existed between labor and the state between the years 1959 to I96L. 
The situation of labor unions before Castro's takeover was 
one engulfed in corruption and involved with gangsterism. Unions 
were used as instruments by the government to control the workers. 
By tradition and habit, the Cuban workers were accustomed to 
government control.Therefore, the first acts of the Castro 
regime, acts of direct interference with labor organizations, 
caused little surprise to the Cuban workers. Programs of nation­
alization placed the Castro government in the position of being 
the leading employer of Cuban labor» This situation created 
the need to require all union leadership to profess loyalty to 
the regime."' Moderate labor leaders were puî ed and replaced 
by government men. For example, Jesus Soto, am extreme leftist, 
was installed as head of the national labor confederation, Con-
federacion de Trabajadores de Cuba, (CTC).̂  ̂
An understanding of the relationship between labor and the 
state requires an examination of labor organization in Castro's 
Cuba from 1959 to 1961*. Employees had to belong to industrial 
%̂aurice Zeitlin, "Labor in Cuba," The Nation, 195 (October 
20, 1962), p. 21*1. 
Hispanic American Report. Ih (February, 196I), p. 879, 
%bid. 
82 
unions. There was a union in each plant «3d a national union for 
each industry* This pattern of organization was topped on the 
national level by the CTG, the central labor organization.̂  
Th#r* were twenty-five national labor unions in Cuba which wei% 
each represented on the Executive Committee of CTG.̂  ̂
Union elections were held in Cuba in October, 1961, Each 
factory elected a union section committee and delegates to a 
national union congress. Two million persons participated in the 
elections.̂  Only in a few of these factories were there genuine 
elections in which several candidates were nominated and cam­
paigned for union office. In most of these elections, one 
candidate was nominated for each office by the government's rep­
resentatives. A general assembly of the workers confirmed the 
nomination, ifowever, other candidates could have been nominated 
if the workers had so wished. No direct pressure was applied by 
the government to prevent such nomination, Cuban workers, con­
ditioned by a long history of government control-, did not choose 
to exercise such initiative even though the elections 'uere 
carried out by secret ballot and each ballot had a space provided 
for write-in candidates, 
According to Zeitlin, the woricers had a "naive faith" in the 
Ĥispanic American Report, lU (October, 1961), p, 69b. 
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union organization sponsored by the Castro regime. The revolution 
had effectively eliminated corruption from the labor movement. 
The workers had no desire to create an independent organizational 
weapon of their unions,̂  
The successful management of labor by the Castro regime was 
al8o implemented by the creation of Grievance Commissions within 
each factory to handle complaints directly at the local level. 
These Grievance Commissions were composed of five-men boards, 
two men representing the factory administration, one representing 
the Ministry of Labor, and two represen̂ ng the factory work 
force. These commissions decided such questions as individual 
grievances concerning wages, working hours, or working conditions. 
If the workers were not satisfied with a coawission's decision, 
they could appeal the case to an Appeals Commission or directly 
to the Ministry of Industry.Cuban workers appeared to be very 
satisfied with the operation of these commissions. 
Labor independence was limited by two methods. The first 
method involved programs of indoctrination sponsored by the 
government. These indoctrination programs were aimed at training 
the worker to promote production without the rewards of higher 
wages. The program was christened, "emulacion socialista".̂ ® 
The goal of the progrma was to increase production under a 
68lbid. 
69lbid., p. 2i&0. 
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socialistic system stimulated by the example of outstandingly 
dedicated workers. The Cuban worker was trained to accept his 
participation in emulacion as a moral obligation. He was taught 
to dedicate his efforts to transform his work into a direct 
service for his country. This attitude was nurtured and fostered 
in special government classes conducted in each factory.The 
workers were strongly encouraged to attend these classes. The 
worker who refused would be subject to indirect social pressures 
but not to direct force. 
Government control was also exercised through the issuance 
of labor work books. These cards showed the grade of skill of 
the worker and his standard wage. The government had justified 
the issuance of these cards by stating that they served as a 
source of information on the distribution of labor and on the flow 
of labor from one section to another to provide a means of pre­
venting labor shortages in key sectors. In actual operation, the 
cards facilitated the government's control of the labor force. 
No one could get a job, quit, or change employait without one 
of these work cards. In order to acquire a card, the worker had 
to fill out a very detailed and specific questionnaire. These 
questionnaires were filed to implement governmental control over 
the worker. 
Tllbid. 
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The Ministry of Labor issued these labor cards, The position 
whlob the Ministry of Labor occupied within the Cuban revolutionary 
system was a very strong one» Since March 11, I960, the national 
labor confederation, CTC, no longer possessed the right to nego­
tiate with factory administrators. The Ministry of Labor possessed 
this right. In addition, this government agency was given full 
authority to settle any labor controversy.̂  ̂ Therefore, we may 
conclude that Cuba's controlled unions stood in second place 
behind the Ministry of La tor. 
What have been the results of Castro's labor planning and 
control? Through revolutionary programs, which built workers' 
centers, nurseries for working mothers, and educational facilities, 
the Cuban worker benefited,Also, there were significant gains 
in employment. Workers were employed more regularly in revolu­
tionary Cuba. Therefore, the majority of Cuban workers became 
fervent supporters of Castro and bis government in spite of the 
government programs which made the worker subject to governmental 
controls both in securing and keeping a job. 
In summation, we may conclude that the Castro government 
involved itself directly in labor relations by acting in three 
roles. The regime was directly involved in union affairs through 
its control of the CTC and individual unions. The goverrwent was 
directly involved in the area of employer-employee relations since 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 13 (April, I960), p. 21*0. 
^̂ Zeitlin, "Labor in Cuba," p, 239. 
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it became the chief employer in Cuba, Ninety-five per cent of 
Cuban industry had been nationalized and seventy per cent of her 
agricultural production had also been nationalized, a condition 
which required a large government payroll. Finally, the Cuban 
government, under Castro's direction, exercised complete control 
over the entire labor structure through the Ministry of Labor. 
After describing the Cuban economic system, it now becomes 
necessary to correlate the description with our theoretic model, 
Frledrich and Brzealnskl have stated that a totalitarian regime 
is characterized by the central control and direction of the 
entire economy. It may clearly be concluded that the Castro 
regime attempted to exercise such central control and direction. 
This control was extensive in the areas of labor and industry. 
Yet within the area of agricultural production, the regime 
limited its control by making concessions to the small farmer of 
Cuba, 
CHAPTER SU 
PATTERNS OF UfE UNDER CASTRO'8 REGIME 
In order to understand a society, it is necessary to study 
that society's political and economic systems. However, these 
systems are cot the total of a society, and an examination of 
these areas alone does not contribute to a complete understanding 
of everyday living conditions within the social system. To grasp 
the complete picture, it becomes necessary to concentrate upon 
the social conditions of the society. Therefore, we «ill now 
begin to look at the conditions within Cuba which comprise the 
elements of the Cuban citizen's daily life. This study will 
examine the living conditions, the role of religion within the 
society, the nature of the society's communications system, edu­
cation, and the role of associational groups. Placed against our 
working model of totalitarianism, the study of Cuban society must 
also include a search for terroristic methods of control and, if 
found, a description of this control and a discussion of reactions 
which such control stimulates within the society. 
During the time period with which this study is concerned, 
the Cuban citizen's living conditions were closely related to the 
government's programs for expanded industrialization and agrarian 
reform. These expanrive progrmns greatly disrupted the Cuban 
economic system. The premature shift of emphasis from sugar 
87 
88 
production, the over-night creation of cooperatives, and the 
sharp shift to state farms contributed to the fall in agricul­
tural production, Cubans were left facing shortages in both 
industrial and agricultural production. The Castro government 
was forced to resort to a system of rationing. 
Government plans were formulated by which basic food commodi­
ties were rationed to the Cuban people. Each Cuban was allowed 
twelve ounces of meat a week, two ounces of butter a month, six 
e^;g£ per month, half a pound of fish every fifteen days, one and 
a half pounds of beans a month, and six pounds of rice each month. 
Children under seven received one quart of ailk per day, while 
for all others, the milk ration was one-fifth of a quart per day. 
Laundry soap, hand soap, detergents, tooth paste, and shoes ware 
also rationed,̂  However, fresh fruits, sugar, coffee, and many 
vegetables were available without any ration limitations,̂  
American visitors to Cuba have reported the results of the 
rationing system. According to observers like Hugh B, Chester, 
Herbert Matthews, and Barbara Skelton, the Cuban people did not 
show any signs of malnutrition. No one in Cuba was starving,3 
The Cuban diet was monotonous, but it was sufficient. In 
"̂Ouba Today—Red, Broke, and Hungry," US Mews and World 
Report, S2 (March 26, 1962), p, la. 
Ĥugh B, Chester, "Cuba Today," Progressive, 26 (September, 
1962), p. la, 
3lhid. 
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revolutionary Cuba, children were especially well-fed.̂  In spite 
of the rationing, Chester concludes that the average Cuban was 
eating more food than at any time before the Castro revolution.̂  
Since Castro and his ministers also lived on the ration, the Cuban 
people, especially the peasants, felt that for the first time in 
Cuba, equal distribution of goods was contributing to a system of 
social justice.& 
Several revolutionary laws affected the average Cuban's 
living conditions. In early 1959, electric rates were reduced 
by one half. Telephone rates were also reduced. In addition, 
the revolutionary law of March 6, 1957» the Rent Law, reduced by 
fifty per cent the rent of all Cubans who earned less than one 
hundred pesos per month.̂  Housing improvements were further 
extended by the building programs in the cooperatives and state 
farms. Finally, revolutionary programs to distribute free medical 
care to Cuban workers and peasants have contributed to the improve­
ment of the living conditions of the poorer classes of Cuban 
society.® 
In analyzing the life of the average Cuban under the Castro 
regime, we have described living conditions. Including food 
î̂atthews. Return to Cuba, p. 6. 
Ĉhester, p, Ul. 
Îbid. 
%orray, p, 2U. 
^Nolff, p. 318. 
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available, housing, and medical care. The description must now 
be extended to include an analysis of the role of religion within 
Castro's Cuba. Out of a population of seven million people, 
around six and one-half million Cubans were baptized Catholic, 
including Castro, himself.̂  The study of practicing, func­
tioning religion within Castro's Cuba is a study of a two-sided 
coin, one side reflecting coexistence with the regime, the other, 
religious restrictions imposed by the government. 
A partially tolerant attitude toward religion was reflected 
in Herbert Matthews' quote of Castro's words: "I don't care 
whether a person is religious or not or what his religion is."10 
Such an attitude was more forcefully espoused by Castro in his 
speech given on the anniversary of the attack on Batista's palace 
led by Jose Antonio Echeverria. The chairman of the ceremonial 
y 
was quoting from one of Echeverria's speeches. This chairman 
% 
deliberately eliminated the following sentence from Echeverria's 
original speech. "We are confident that the purity of our inten­
tions will bring us the favor of God to achieve a reign of justice 
in our land."H This omission infuriated Castro, who immediately 
delivered an entire speech based upon the deleted sentence. 
Can we be so cowardly, so mentally crippled, that we 
have the moral poverty to suppress three lines? ... 
We Icnow that a Revolutionary csm have a religious belief. 
Ĥispanic American Report, 13 (October, I960), p. 526. 
^̂ îiatthews. Return to Cuba, p. 13. 
l̂ reene, "Return to Cuba," p. 18. 
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The Revolution does not force men, it does not intrude 
into their personal beliefs. It does not exclude anyone, 
The Vatican did not break diplomatic relations with Havana, 
There was an Inter-Nuncio in Havana and a Cuban Ambassador at 
the Holy See,̂  ̂ When the Nuncio vas celebrating the coronation 
of Pope Paul VI, Castro paid him a courtesy visit which lasted for 
an hour and a half.̂  
A further example of the coexistence of religion with the 
Castro regime «as the fact that churches were open in revolutionary 
Cuba and they were crowded,1̂  In addition, church members read 
a regular column of Catholic news in one of Havana's newspapers. 
An occasional article by a Protestant pastor was also printed. 
Conflicts between organized religion and the Castro regime 
appeared to be centered in the area of education. The regime had 
condemned the teaching of religion in schools. This condemnation 
culminated in the nationalization in 1961 of all private schools. 
Teachers and directors of private schools were allowed to continue 
at their jobs, but they became subject to state direction and not 
to their religious orders, 
Îbid. 
l̂ Ibld. 
%bld. 
l̂ Carl Migdail, "After Five and one-half years of Communism— 
How Cuba Looks Today," US News and world Report. 57 (August 31, 196lt), 
p. 36. 
^̂ «Cuba Paints Its Own Shade of Red," Business Week, (June 13, 196U), 
p. it6, 
l̂ Hispanic American Report, lii (July, 1961), p. 1*08. 
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Following an anti-government demonstration in front of a 
Catholic church in Havana, Auxiliary Bishop Mwardo Boza Masvidad 
and one hundred and tM.rty-five priests were arrested and deported 
to Spain, Bishop Masvidad and forty-six of the priests were Cuban 
citizens.̂ ® Castro made the further announcement that all priests 
who were foreign born and had been demonstrating an antl-govem-
ment attitude while In Cuba would be forced to leave the country. 
However, he also stated that foreign-bom priests who cooperated 
with the revolution would be allowed to stay.̂  ̂
Catholic leaders in turn responded to the government's action, 
Archbishop of Santiago, Enrique Perez Serantes, in mid-1960 issued 
a pastoral letter which condemned the Castro government's shift 
OQ 
toward the left. However, the Church did not decide to take 
any direct action against the government. The Catholic Church 
possessed the dj.rect weapon of exccsnmunication. According to 
Canon Law, the act of impeding or imprisoning Roman Catholic 
Bishops is an act which Incurs excommunication. Since Castro and 
his officials have committed this act, they became subject to 
the excommunication̂  ̂However, the Church did not make public any 
such action and appeared to be avoiding the entire issue. 
It may be concluded that the Catholic Church in revolutionary 
^̂ liispanie American Report, 1# (November, 1961), p. 790» 
Hispanic American Report, Ik (July, 1961), p. ii08« 
^̂ Hispanic American lleport, 13 (July, I960), p. 310. 
ZlHispanlc American Report, Ig (March, 1962), p. 31. 
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Cuba was allowed to function in its capacity as director of 
religious functions. But its influence was allowed to include 
only religious matters. The regime would not tolerate its inter­
ference in the fields of either education or politics. 
As religion is an intricate component of social life so are 
communications. The communication system, including press, radio, 
television, and movies, was colored and modified by the rule of 
the Castro regime. For example, in December, 1959, the eve of 
Castro's victory, there were sixteen daily newspapers in Havana, 
After the Castro victory, five of these newspapers, EL Pais, 
Excelsior, Manana, Olarlo Hacional, and Republica were closed, 
The remaining papers fell under complete government control. 
Revolucion was created as the semi-official newspaper of the 26th 
of July Movement, Hoy, the organ of the Cuban communist party, 
was allowed to publish by Castro without any interference,̂  ̂
Gradually, the total number of newspapers coming off the 
Cuban presses began to dwindle. Their editors, such as Jorge 
Zayas and Jose Ignancio Rivero, went into exile. This dwindling 
of newspapers and the exile of editors reflected the reaction to 
the goverrfflient̂ s enactment of a plan to "free the press," This 
government plan allowed newspaper workers to add clarifying state­
ments at the end of articles which opposed Castro or his regime. 
An example of such notation was piven in the Hispanic American 
^̂ îiispanic American Report, 13 (July, I960), p. 309, 
^̂ Ibid., p. 309. 
9k 
Hegorb, According to the inserted ccsament, the particular article 
in question . , • "expresaed the views of the newspaper management 
but the mployees considered it untrue and not in accordance with 
the most elammtal newspaper ethics. 
Commenting on this postscript device, the Executive Board of 
the Provincial College of Journalists in Havana concluded that 
there was freedom of the press in revolutionary Cuba. According 
to a statement released by the board, 
This freedom is no longer simply for the owner or seller 
of Information, but for the journalist, for the manual 
worker and intellectual to make known his positima 
regarding false, anti-patriotic and tendeoti-ous Informa-
ti(m by means of postscript or annotation, a procedure 
... that is one of the finest achievements of jouma-
lifflB and freedom of expression.̂ 5 
However, the board failed to report that these clarifying ctmamts 
have been used only against articles which criticijwd or C(mti%-
26 
dieted the governmental position. 
fte Castro government ocmpleted its program of publication 
control by finally allowing nothi»̂  but pro-government articles 
to be printed in the Cuban press. Castro refused to stand for 
any cidticism. To facilitate this government control and regula­
tion of the Cuban press, a govenment news agency was created, 
Prenaa Latina, whose pubHeation set the pattern for what was 
^̂ aispanie Anwilean Report, 13 (March, I960), p. 175. 
2$Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro and Co. Inc. (New York* 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964;, p. 89. 
2%tiLd., p. 91. 
9̂  
acceptable printing matter in Cuba» AU other Cuban newspapers 
were placed under the control of a central propagmda directorate.̂  ̂
It mâ  be clearly conclMed that there was actually no freedm of 
the press in Castro's Cuba. 
The movie induatî , television, and radio were also subject 
to governmental regulation within revolutionary Cuba. Institute 
Cmbano del Arto Industria Cinmatograficos (ICAIC) was granted 
the authority to declare films counterrevolutionary. Such HIbs 
trere not allowed to be shmm.̂  ̂ Castro justified this action by 
stating that Cuba was in a revolutionary stage and since films 
wield such a powerful Influence, they must be in accord with 
revolutionary principles. 
Furthezw)re, radio broadcasting stations were also subject 
to government control. TWy praised Castro and his government and 
never indulged their facilities in the field of political criticima. 
MLth tbm seizure of CMQ Channel Six, the last independent station, 
all television channels became subject to government control.̂  
Radio and televiid-on stations were directed by the central direc­
torate which also supervised press publications.̂  
A controlled system of communications, including press, radio, 
27Max Frankel, "Case Study of a Police State," New Yoric Times 
Magazine. (April 30, 1961), p. 88. 
®̂Iliaabeth Sutherland# "Letter From Havana," Nation, 193 
(November h, 1961), p. 358. 
^̂ Hlspfflttic American Report. 13 (March, I960), p. 175. 
^̂ Frankel, p. 88. 
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and television, provides a transmission belt for the goverment 
to use in transmitting policies to the people. The proo##e aî 
transmitting broad general goals is best performed through the 
society's educational system. Therefore, it becomes vital to 
investigate Cuba's educational goals, programs, and operating 
fmoiliti##. 
In 1961, the Castro regime faced the problem of dealing with 
one million illiterates in a population of seven million.̂  Ihs 
Castro governsfflttt, operating through Armando Hart's Ministry of 
Education, began to formulate plîms to correct this situation. 
Two extreme approaches were utilized. At one extreme, Fidel 
Castro, Haul Castro, Che Guevara, and other leading government 
officials became teachers. On television, on radio, and at mass 
meetings these men became patient instructors, explaining history 
and economics to the Cuban people. Their work could be considered 
as a method of making gmeral backgroimd knowledge available to 
the people# At the other extreme, illiteracy was attacked by 
seaSing an army of young volunteers to live with Cuba's peasants 
and to teach. 
Castro christened 1961 as the "Year of Education." At his 
0(mmand all Cuban yomgsters between the sixth grade and high 
school left their Havana homes to go to the interior of Cuba 
3lEliaabeth Sutherland, "Castro's Work for the Peasants," 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, 85 (December lU, 1961), p. 7. 
^̂ HacGaffey and Bamett, p. 286. 
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where they spent eight months working with Cuba's Illiterate 
adult peasants.33 in order to facilitate this program, Cuba's 
grammar and secondary schools were closed two months ahead of 
schedule and remained closed until December, 1961,3̂  
By February, 1962, Education Minister Hart reported that as 
a result of the work performed by thousands of Cuba's very young 
teachers, some 707,000 persoma bad been trained to read and 
write. Illiteracy had been reduce to 3,9 per cent.3̂  These 
peasants were far from being fully educated, but at least they 
had attained a first or second grade level of literacy. The 
govemnent immediately set to woric establishing follow-up schools 
to continue the training of these peasants. By November, 1962, 
36 
Loo,(XX) adults were enrolled in these follow-up schools. 
Educational programs for adults were expanded beyond tW 
literacy campaigns. Special educational programs were established 
in Cuban factories. By 1962, 100,000 adults were @3rolled in these 
worfcer improvement schools and an additional 50,0CK) adults were 
enrolled in night schools located on the state farms.3̂  
For the youth of Cuba, the Castro government spared no effort 
on behalf of their education and welfare. ïoung people were 
33»Co0BBie8 and Cub Scouts," America, 105 (April 1, 1961), p. 2. 
3̂ Hi8panic American Report, Ik (May, 1961), p. 217. 
3̂ Hi8panic American Report, 1& (February, 1962), p. IĈ O. 
36Hi8panlc American Report, l5 (November, 1962), p. 806. 
37ibid. 
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tzwiaported from Cuba's interior, given shoes and clothing, and 
were lodged in the confiscated mansions located in Havana or in 
speciallf built camps. At government expense, the students #ere 
well fed. Their educational curriculum was based upon concentrated 
courses in technical subjects. In 196ii, there were about 100,000 
scholarship students.̂  Also the government issued $,000 special 
scholarships for medical and engineering studies to graduates of 
basic secondary schools.Also, equal educational opportunities 
extended to women, Negroes, and mulattoes. The University 
of Havana, which in pre-revolution days had a student body composed 
of only t«i per cent girls, had a student body with forty per cent 
girls in 196L. It also had a far higher percentage of Negroes 
and mulattoes than before the revolution.̂ ® In addition, 
extensive building programs increased the number of secondazy 
and eleraentary schools in revolutionary Cuba.̂  
The preceding description illustrates the active role of tM 
Cuban government in the implementation of educational Improvements. 
This description leads to the question of the degree to which 
political considerations are involved in Cuba's present educational 
system. An introductory anmmr to this question was provided 
in tlm official report by the OuWm goverment to the UNESCO 
3%igdail, p. iiO. 
^̂ Hlspanic American fleport, l5 (January, 1963), p. lOĈ . 
%̂atthews. Return to Cuba, p. 10. 
^Ibid., p. 9. 
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Goaferenee on EdiicaW-on and Eeoncœrf.c and Social Development held 
In Santiago, Chile in 1962, 
The aim of education in the New Cuba include these of 
instilling in our children and young people an uxureserved 
love for their country and a sense of solidarity with the 
wrknrs and peoples of all lands in their noble struggle 
for a free and happy life, and of teaching them to abhor 
imperialist wars of plunder and to strive steadfastly 
for peace.̂ 2 
According to Richard Jolly, the intention to use the Cubm 
educational system for political purposes was openly declared 
by the Castro regime.Curriculum planning was orientated 
around a base of Marxist indootrination.This was coupled with 
teaching a love for Fidel Castro in Cuba's classrooms. According 
to Education Minister Armando Hart, "Evm in arithrotic class 
teachers have to preach loyalty to fldel,"̂  ̂
The government exercised its contTOl over the complete struc­
ture of Cuban education through a centralized board of advisors 
in Havana, which worked under Castro's supervision. The influence 
of the Havana board extended even to the level of daily lesson 
plans used in Cuban classrooms. The board issued model lesson 
plans wiaich teachers and local administrator* had to use. All 
textbooks had to receive the approval of the board. These lesson 
bZaichard Jolly, "Education," in Cuba. The Econome and Soci&l 
Evolution, ed. by Dudly SeeM (Horth Carolina: the ijnivemity 
ô  North ̂ rolina Press, 196&), p. 3U9. 
Wlbid., p. 3U6. 
Âîrrutia, p. 96. 
kSprankel, p. 89. 
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plans and tœKtbooks placed special emphasis upon government 
approved ideology and programs directed to foster nationalism,̂  ̂
Schools of Hevoltitlonarj Instruction irtiich specialised in 
the teaching of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism were 
established throughout Cuba. The course offered by these schools 
was three months long. Classes took place during the evening 
to facilitate the attendance of working adults.Teachers, of 
course, were encouraged to attend such classes. In addition, 
teachers were provided with a gowmwent-issued handbook, Alfa-
betic«08, the contents of which were strongly politically 
oriented.̂  
Indoctrination proceeded from teacher to pupil, Richard 
Jolly illustrates the nature of this indoctrinaW.on by pmviding 
examples of questions used in Cuban textbooks. For example, in 
an arithmetic textbook, the following question was asked* 
The Ku ELux Klan was founded in the US in 1886 to 
maintain by terror the suprem̂ y of the white race. 
For how many years has this infamous society existed 
in our neighbor's land?w9 
A further example of this indoctrlnatlm was seen in an 
SKerclae given in 7encerem>s« a pH.mr for Cuban youngsters. The 
exercise involved having the students read and then write words 
à6î4acGaffey and Banaett, p. 286. 
7̂jolly, p. 207. 
W 
9̂ibid., p. 363. 
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or sentences. One eamrclee was built around the phrase, "Toung 
and old united, we swear with Fidel, to defend Cuba together» We 
shall never be defeated,*50 
Govenment regulatory program* extended to the currioiilum 
and faculty of the Dniversity of Havana. The Havana University 
had enjoyed a traditional autonoŝ y, an autonomy which facilitated 
young Castro's rebellioue activities against Batista «hUe Castro 
was attending the University law school, Castro now declared 
that all teachers and students in the University who disagreed 
with government programs would be dimissed.̂  ̂
¥e may now formulate a conclusion frcws this description of 
education under the Castro regime. Educational facilities wem 
expended and improved under Castro's direction. But this expan-
i 
sion and improvement served as instruments of governmental control 
over the society. 
To understand social conditions in Cuba our study must be 
«Kpanded from an analysis of educational facilities to a descrip­
tion of the status of associatdonal groups in Castro's Cuba, 
Associational groups went through two stages in revolutionary 
Cuba, The first stage involved the destruction of pre-revolu-
M-onary groups. Most of the associations whose membership was 
rooted in tM upper and middle classes disappeared. Only the 
profesadonal associations were left, but their organizations 
%hd.d.. p. 358, 
F̂rankel, p, 88 
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were modified by governmental action. Within each professional 
assoeiatdon, a board of directors ms appointed by the government. 
This board operated as a revolutionary tribunal which worked to 
disqualify from professional practice any person accused of 
counterrevolutionaiy activity. The tribunal of the Havana 
association of lawyers had expelled sixty member# by July, I960. 
The Havana medical tribunal suspended annual medical convention# 
and also expelled several member# from practicing in Havana because 
of their political beliefs. Similar action occurred in the asso­
ciations for jouïîialists, radio announcers, public accountants, 
and engineers.̂  ̂
In 1962, the Cuban Masonic Association was the recipient of 
violent government action. Cuban troops occupied the Masonic 
temple in Havana and arrested several Masonic leaders including 
the Grand Master.̂  Cuban adHtiaiaen also occupied the head­
quarters of the Knights of Columbus, the Catholic Labor Association, 
and the Catholic Laymen's Lodge, 
The second stage in the changing status of associational 
groups in Castro's Cuba was the formation of several government-
sponsored organizations. For example, the Federation of Cuban 
Women, formed from existing women's organizations by the wives 
^̂ Maê affey and itomett, p. 279. 
%bld., p. 280. 
Ĥispanic American Report, 1$ (*îovmnber, 1962), p. 805. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 13 (January, 1961), p. 786. 
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of Ra.t̂  Castro and Gh# Guevara, «as created. An oî anisation 
entitled the National Front of Professional Um and Technicians 
was fomed. Finally, the organizational structure included two 
assodational groups for young peoples the Association of ïouag 
Rebels, for youth raaging in age from fourteen to twenty-five, 
and the Union of Rebel Pioneers, for children of seven to fourtem 
years of age,̂  ̂
At the apex of government-sponsored organizational activity 
was placed the Cuban militia, the orgmnimatlon which gave to the 
men mû women wto did not fight in the Sierra Maestre a sense of 
direct participation in the revolutionary victory. According to 
Samuel Shapiro, who tmveled through the provinces of Cuba in 
1962, he was almost never out of sight of an armed man or womm, 
"Every office building, every hotel, bus station, residential 
block, and factory is guarded by olive drab militiamen 1A0 have 
rifles or machine guns and know how to use thwB,"̂  ̂ Shapiro met 
teenagers able to take anti-aircraft guns apart and put thm 
together again. He also described meeting a sixty-fin̂  year old 
grandmother shouldering a rifle. These militiamen believed they 
were defeMing Cuba from her memies and an enê  was anyone, 
national or foreigner, who opposed M.d̂ . 
The government strongly enoouz%ged the Cuban pecpls to belong 
%̂acOaffey and Baraett, p. 281, 
^̂ Smuel Shapiro, *Cuba Today Eyewitness Report," The Ration. 
195 (September, 1962), p. 150, 
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to these revolutionary oi%amlmations. A citizen who refueed to 
parM-cipate was reflecting by his actions a disloyal attitude. 
Disloyalty would be considered as counterrevoluttonary and could 
qualify the individual as being an enemy of the regiî * Conse­
quently, membership in these organizations was very extensive. 
In studying social conditions in Cuba, m have been slowly 
moving up a descriptive pyramid, which Included tW relationship 
of the goverommmt to food supplies and general living conditions, 
to religion, communications, education, and associations# finally, 
we have reached the top of the pymmld with a description of 
police control over the Cuban population. In 1962, Castro estab­
lished a Ministry of Interior, giving to this ministry the respon­
sibility for maintaining public order. The creation of the 
ministry served as a method of centralizing all police units in 
Cut» in order to develop a strong and effective security system. 
fhe security systm within Cuba operated at both the lower 
and higher levels. At the lower levels, the neighborhood base, 
were found the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution* 
These committees functioned In a watch dog capacity, reporting 
disloyal or suspicious action to higher authorities. After the 
Bay of Pigs invasion, the lists of suspects turned in by these 
defense committees appeared to be the basis for the arrast of 
SSpĵ mjcel, p. 69. 
^̂ "The Castro Regime in Cuba,* Departf̂ nt of State, p. 19. 
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of several Cubans.̂ ® 
Moving up the security structure, we encounter the regular 
armed forces which totaled around 100,000 men. This force was 
fortified by the 2̂ 0,000 militia member#.̂  Finally, we come 
to the top of the security system which was occupied by the Gg, 
the national Gubm secret police and the investigating corps of 
the Cuban government. According to ccœplaints presented to tte 
Inter-Aneilcan Commission, Cuban citizens were subject to arbi-
tz%ry arrests by G2 officials. The arrested individual was tMn 
transported to the Gg headquarters in Havana where he was isolated 
md subject to interrogation involving psychological torture, 
Legislation enacted by the Castro regime also contributed 
to a society subject to police control. Bevolutionaiy Decree 
Number 988 designated five crimes which were punishable by death 
within forty-eight hours of capture. The czlaes were: burning 
si%ar cane, aiding GounterTevolutlonari.es, helping traitors from 
abroad, acts of sabatoge in Cuban cities, and carrying weapons 
without governmental permission, 
Tad Sxule chaises that Cubans program of rationing also 
%̂acGaffey and Bamett, p. 282. 
^̂ ad Szule, "CastroÎ How Strong? How Long?,» New York 
Times Magazine, (Septmber 23, 19̂ ), p. 25. 
R̂eport on the Situation of Political Prisoners and Their 
Relatives in Cuba, p. 2U. 
63HGastro»s Latest» Firing Squads for Farmers," US New 
and World Report, $2 (January 22, 1962), p, 30. 
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contributed to effective police control. Each Cuban city dweller 
received a ration book which was registered and made available 
to the police. This procedure made it impossible for outsiders 
to establish residence in the cities without the goveimment'e 
knowledge. Thus, underground movements were severely hindered 
from developing.̂  
Thia kind of control was further implemmted by the Law of 
Urban Reform of OctoWr, I960. This law prevented citizens from 
changing residence without government permission. The Cuban who 
wished to move had to secure government authorization from a 
Superior CJounsul, the official who administered the Urban Reform 
Law»A Cuban caught carrying so much as a chair in a city 
street was subject to airest for suspicion of violating the law. 
The privacy of the Cuban's residence was challenged by Law 
Number k99, involving the control of the Aedes-Aegipti mosquito. 
Empowered by tliis law, the Cuban police was granted the authority 
to mcerciee unannooneed access to any residence at any hour in 
search of the death-carrying mosquito. It has been charged that 
the law has been grâ ly abused as machine gun-bearing officers 
knocked down doors to search the homes of Cubans suspected of 
disloyalty.̂  
One method which may be used in evaluating the effectiveness 
^aule, p. 25» 
%̂he Castro Regime in Cuba, US Department of State, p. b* 
%bid., p. U. 
107 
of this police system is to examine the existence or non-exlsteno® 
of effective opposition to the government. An examination of 
Castro's Cuba revealed the existence of two types of protest to 
government policies. The first type Involved the utilization of 
a form of passive resistance. Instead of fleeing to the raotmtains 
to wage an active war of opposition against the government, several 
thousand CJubans chose simply to leave Cuba# Freedom Tower in 
Havana was the receiving house for the 150,OCX) refugees who left 
Cuba, The mental image of a weary traveler dressed in rags and 
carrying his few possessions in a bundle would not fit the Cuban 
emigre, Ninety-eight per cent of the refugees from Cuba arrived 
in Miami by jet. They were clean and well-fed. "They represent 
67 
Cuba's middle class on the move." ' 
Fidel Castro did not restrain these people by physical means. 
Bach refugee was required by tte Cuban government to leave the 
greater part of his poasesrions. He had to pay the Ministry of 
Finance twenty-five dollars before departing. Also, the Cuban 
who wished to leave his country had to secure a pewit from the 
Havana civil service. Only one professional group experienced 
extreme difficulty in securing these permits. These were Cuban 
doctors, TW regime placed unofficial barracades in the way of 
doctors wishing to leave, barricades which made it difficult for 
a doctor to secure a permit. However, the large number of Cubans 
who successfully secured permits and left Cuba proves that the 
67»Refugees from Castro," Eeonomlgt, 205 (December 22, 1962), p. 12di. 
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government procedures involved in securing the right to leave 
were by no seams insuraountable. If Cubans did not wish to 
remain in their country, Castro did not seem to want them,̂  
Sosie of these Cuban refugees chose to transform their 
passive opposition to Castro into an active form after leaving 
Cuba. Counterrevolutionary groups were formed in Inland, Mexico 
City, and Puerto fiico. The various opposition groups such as 
the Directorio Revolucionarlo Eetudiantil sent agents back into 
Cuba to conduct anti-government programsj, including urban terrorisa, 
to undermine the Caatro regime,̂  
The exile opposition groups were merged to form the Frente 
Democratioo levolucionarlo. It was this group which operated 
under CIA direction to undertake a direct invasion of the Cuban 
homeland. Their endeavor ended in seventy-two hours at the Bay 
of Pigs in 1961 when Castro squashed the attack, 
Since I960, other Cubans dissatisfied with Castro's govern­
ment have chosen to oppose him directly by operating within the 
country» Groups of counterrevolutionaries have fled to the 
Sierra Maestre and to the Sierra Escambray in Las Villas Province, 
These groups have operated much as Castro did during his days in 
%bld.. p. 120$. 
^"Forgotten Young Men," National Review, 15 (August 13, 
1963), p. 105. 
7%eith Wheeler, «Hell of a Beating in Cuba," Life. 50 
(April 28, 1961), p. 17. 
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the Sierra Maestre, eondmcting gmerrllla activities,̂  Their 
aetivities were extended into urban areas where bcsabinga have 
oeeurrcd» It was reported in Ckstober» 19̂  that, terroxlsts 
attmptW to kill Castro by sprajlng his automobile idth maehine 
gun bluets. Reporters have speculated that these GuWa 
terrorists have made several attempts to assassinate the Preiser, 
but tĥ  have never been reported in the Cubem press, 
Who were these terrorists? the majoiity of the guerrillas, 
wkase onaber was estimated at around three hundred wn, were 
foraer Castro followers who became dissatisfied with the regime. 
They were led by former Castro officers such as Manuel Beaton and 
Nino I&amJ) 
The effeotivmess of the guerrillas was strcmgly dilutwi 
by the results of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The aftermath of 
the invasion ma a slovdotm in all counterrevolutionary activity 
in Culm* The rebels* organization was weakened by government 
arrests and ty a populace which conceived of opposition to tW 
Cuban government as being motivated by foreigners. Cuban nation­
alisa triumphed over counterrevolutionary activities. 
These forms of opposition—refugees, exile groups, suad guer­
rilla fighters—were effectively balanced by the groups within 
Ĥispanic American Report, 13 (November, I960), p. 6o8. 
^̂ Hispanic American Report, 13 (Decaaber, I960), p. 696, 
^̂ Hispanic Ajwrlean Iteport, 13 (June, I960), p. 238» 
^^îflLspanic American Report, lit (August, 19&L), p. k99. 
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the Cuban society which etrongly supported the govemmmt. First, 
there were the young people who were directly benefiting from a 
government which meemed dedicated to their welfare. Since one-
half of the population in Cuba was below the age of twenty-five, 
this was obviously a trmendous source of strength for the regiw,̂  ̂
f 
âlso there w@m the Negroes and mulattoes whose members compose 
one-fourth of the population. Under the Castro regime, they have 
achieved rights equal to those of their fellow Cubans. The public 
places of Havana have become filled with them as they «Kercise 
their new rights.FinsCLly, there were the poor of Cuba, Accor­
ding to Max Frankel, they supported Castro's regime because 
"they may get a new house, or because they remember misery and 
pilsons md torturesThey might not say so but they reveal 
that they also back Castro "because som» derive satisfaction from 
seeing the zdLch on the run and the luxuidooj hotels overrun."78 
Each of these elements m have studied—living conditions, 
religion, associations, the comunleatlon system, and police con-
trol—omMne to form a description of what living under Castm 
meant. It now becmaes possible to apply this description to our 
theoretical model and to see in which areas the two patten» 
%gule, p. 27. 
^̂ •Shaughnessy, p. jSk* 
7?Mmx Frankel, "Journey of Inquiry in Castro's Cuba," New 
tùXk Times Magazine, (January 22, 1̂ 61), p. 8, 
%bid. 
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correspond. For example, Friedrich and Brzeadnski categorise a 
totalitarian regime as «xercising a monopoly over the entire 
communication system of tW ®3Ciety. In Cuba, we have found that 
independent facilities of the press, radio, television, and movie 
films did not exist. These media were subject to government con­
trol and government direction# Coaaiinications contnal in a total!» 
tarian regime extends to the area of education, according to 
Fïledrich and Brzezinski» Our study of Cuba corresponds to this 
description. The Cuban educational system was directed by the 
government. Included among educational goals in Cuba were plans 
to indoctrinate the population in Marxiam-Leninlm, the official 
ideology of the regime# This feetor also fits the theoretical 
description of Frledrlch and Brtezinski. 
Hannah Arendt*s work may be oomblned with that of Friedrich 
md Brzezinski in the area of descritrfjjg totalitarian terror. 
These authoM present a description of spy systems, arbitrary 
laws, and secret police as coî poaents of a totalitarian system. 
In Castro's Cuba, the Cammittees for the Defense of the Involution 
performed the function of spy organizations. The Gg was Cuba's 
secret police. The various laws, such as the Urban Reform Law, 
the labor laws, the ration books contri.lmted to the police control 
of Cuba's {Hjpulation, 
Feierabend and Ebenstein describe the totalitarian system as 
one in which autonomous organizations are non-existent. The study 
of Cuba revealed the destruction of pre-revolutionary groups aM 
associations and their replacement by government controlled 
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organizations. We found that government interference in Cuba 
extended into the field of religion. However, in the case of 
Cuba, we did find a modification to complete government control. 
The Gatholle Church, prevented from Interfering in either politics 
or education, was permitted by the government to retain a certain 
measure of autonomy in operating its charohes. 
Therefore, we have been able to apply our theoretleal model 
to the case study of Cuba and we have found a correspondence in 
the areas of a coMounicatione monopoly, police control, and the 
status of associations. However, in the case study of Cuba, we 
also discovered Wo elememts which mildly affect the theoretical 
model. The mlstence of an armed citizenry or national militia 
coupled with the existmce of armed opposition within Cuba to the 
government intrwiuoes a refinement to Friedrich and Brzezinski's 
descî ptdon of a near-complete weapons monopoly. Although the 
regime did control highly tectaologically advanced weapons such 
as tanks, jet fighters, and field artillery, smaller weapons were 
possessed by non-govemment personnel. However, it must also be 
remembered that a citizen or a guerrilla fighter armd with a rifle 
cannot effectively combat a tank. 
We may finally conclude that in the area of social conditions 
within Cuba, we were able to find definite totalitarian charac­
teristics. But these characteristics must be diluted by the fact 
that withÎJî Cuba there existed a majority of citizens who actively 
supported the government, not out of fear but as a reaction to 
revolutionary pmgrams which benefited them. 
GHAPTBR SEVEN 
C0NCLD8I0W8 
The case study of Castro's Cuba during the years 19$? to 
1961* has included a description of the Cuban revolution, the man 
who led this revolt, the political situation in Cuba, the Cuban 
economic systm, and finally, eoeial conditions In Cuba. It new 
becomw necessary to answer the key question with which this 
thesis is concerned. Was Castro's Cuba from 19$9 to 1961$ a 
totalitarian regime? Before we try to answer this question, w® 
might restate the definition of a totalitarian regime as presented 
by Brzezinakl. 
Totalitarianism is a system in which technologically 
advanced instruments of political powr are wielded idth-
out restraint by centralized leadersliip of an elite move­
ment for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, 
including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain 
arbitrary Ideological assû tlons proclaimed by the leader­
ship, in an ataiosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire 
population.̂  
It is possible to take each component of this definition, 
coupled with the refin̂ ents of the original theoretical model 
presented in this thesis, and to apply these descriptions to the 
situation which existed in Cuba. For example, we may begin by 
utilizing the first component of the definition, "technologically 
iBrzezlnski, "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics,» p. 180, 
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advanced Instruments of political power." 
This technologically advanced aspect of totalltarimlem 
affects the areas of weapons, coBstiunication facilities, and économie 
facilities. In evaluating the weapon force available to the Castro 
regime, we must determine if this force can be categorized as 
being technologically advanced. The Cuban regime was very well 
equipped with modem weapons, including jet fighters, tanks, field 
artillery, autsti-aircraft artillery, mortars, patrol vessels, and 
torpedo boats. In addition, the regime directed a militia and m 
army equipped with modem small aras. It was these modem weapons 
which enabled the Castro regime to crush the Bay of Pigs invasion 
in only seventy-two hours.̂  It may be definitely concluded that 
the Castro regime possessed technologically advanced, modem 
instruments of power to Implement its political strength, 
Brzezlnski combined his work with FVisdrich to further refine 
and devflop the concept of technologically advanced weapons as 
applied to the totalitarian state. According to these authors, 
the totalitarian regime possesses a near-complete monopoly of all 
means of effective armW combat within the society. The case 
study of Cuba revealed two conditions within Castro's Cuba tsrtiich 
must be considered in evaluating the regime's control of the 
forces of armed combat. Within Cuba was found evidence of effec­
tive armed opposition to the government. Also within Cuba was 
fo;md an armed citizenry, members of the Cuban militia. These 
%i?heeler, p. 17. 
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two conditions would appear to modify Brzeainski and Friedrich*s 
description. Yet when one evaluates the weapons available to 
the guerrilla opposition and to the militia, it is still possible 
to maintain that the Castro regime possessed a near-complete 
weapons monopoly. It was the regime which possessed contẑ l of 
highly technologically advanced weapons such as tanks and jet 
fighters, instruments of power which far outshadowed small arms 
such as pistols mid rifles# 
Returning to Braezlnski's definition and continuity with the 
concept of technologically advanced instnments of political power, 
we find that technology is clearly evident in the area of communl-
catlons. Therefore, we are now able to extend this parW.eular 
concept to Friedrich and Brzezinski's description of the totali­
tarian state as one in which the regime possesses a near-complete 
monopoly of all effective media of mass coaaranications. Our case 
study revealW that Cuba's modem coamunication facilities became 
instruments of the government used to transmit goverament-approved 
policies. 
Finally, Brzezinski's utilization of technology is applicable 
to the area of economic production. As Fzledrich and Brzezinskl 
point out, the totalitarian regime exercises a central control and 
dlrecMon of the entire economy through a bureaucratic organization. 
The Case stû y of Cuba revealed, that Cuba's Industries were 
nationalized, labor oẑ anlzations functioned as Instruments of 
the government, and the flow of capital within the Cuban ectmmlc 
systm was government-controlled through a nationalized banking 
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syatem. k national planning organ was established to formulate 
a C(mpl@te eeonomic blueprint. Yet, as our case study illus­
trated, the central control and direction of agricultural pro­
duction was s<meiAat limited. A visit to IMRA or a visit to 
the farm of one of Cuba's independent farmers would modify the 
concept of complete, centrally directed control. The most 
KKtenslve planning organisation, ISM, appeared to be staffed 
with dedicated but very unô aniaed young men. The small farmer 
of Cuba was still functioning in a limitW capacity. 
From the concept of technology, Braeadnski's general defini­
tion next includes the component of political powr which is 
"wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite 
movment," This concept was further refined by Friedrich and 
Brzezinski in their combined description of totalitarian cen­
tralized leadership categorized by a single party typically led 
by one man. The study of Cuba revealed the existence of a cen­
tralized leadership led by Fiddl Castro aœî composed of bis very 
loyal, tested lieutenants. The nature of this leadership evolved 
/ y 
around the concept of the willadLted power of the llder aaxlBo wM 
dmninated every facet of political power. This was leadership 
colored by Castro *8 magnetic personality coupled with the Cuban 
concept of the caudillo. The Cuban communist party's challenge 
to this leadership was effectively net. Castro remained the llder, 
dominating the government, the armed forces, and Cuba's newly 
organised single party. His power rmuained unlimited, subject 
neither to elections nor to the restraints of an indepmdmt 
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judleiâiy. 
According to the third component of Braezinski's definition, 
this leadership is motivated by the purpoi» of effecting a total 
social revolution. This description accurately fits the Castro 
regime* Un<ter the leadership of Castro and his lieutenants, the 
existing economic, political, social, and BdUtaiy structures of 
pre-revolutionary Cuba were completely destroyed. They wre 
replaced by revolutionary innovations Wiich cmpletely trans­
formed Cuba. The upper classes of Cuba were robbed of their 
pomitlon of leadeitJhip, A right-wing conservative leadership 
elite was replaced by the left-wing radical revolutionaries. The 
false democratic front which forwrly characterized Cuban ï̂ liti<al 
rule was destroyed, to be replaced by a communist regime. Depen­
dence upon the United States was supplanted a turn to tlm 
socialist camp. Finally, the capitalistic economic system was 
transfon̂ d into a socialist system Implemented by centralized 
planning»̂  
Brzezinski concludes his definition by stating that a 
totalitarian regime is characterized by programs designed to 
condition the society's citizens according to ideological fomats 
proclaimed by the regime *in an atwephem of coerced unanimity," 
The case study of Cuba revealed active government programs to 
condition the Cuban citizen. These programs were implmented 
through the government's monopoly of control over the entire 
M̂atthews, R#tum to Cuba, p, 3. 
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cmammleatlons ay#tern. TW press, radio, television, and movies 
became instrumente of the govenment# The Cuban people heard 
and saw through theae media only what the government allowed 
them to hear and see. The monopoly was extended to the field of 
ediieation. This control was capped by the non-existence of 
completely autonomous associations in Cuba, Government-organized 
associations in revolutionazy CuW possessed the complete monopoly 
of organizational membership. 
Braezinski's reference to ideology is also applicable to Cuba, 
whose leader professed to be a followr of the philosophy he 
labeled as îiarxism-Leninism, However, this was iferxism-Leninism 
Cuban style. This was a label which was applied to the method, 
to the means, or enacting revolutionazy pxt>graas. This label 
placed Cuba among the communist bloc of nations. Yet the formali-
zatlmi process of the label was not completely effected in Cuba. 
One simply did not find the disciplined structure in Cuba which 
one finds in the older communist states. Each one of the men 
who j^ayed a significant role in tW Cuban revolution, including 
Fidel, Raul, and Che, had different ideas of what Marxism-Leninism 
meant. The Castro regime faced drastic economic, social, and 
political problems. MandLsm-I^ninism gave them a label to apply 
to thd.r drastic programs of social reform.^ But the revolution 
was not yet completely institutionalized. Programs were still 
being formulated. The leaders needed a wide area in which to flex 
kbid.. p. 10 
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their mental muscles. They were not ready to be completely 
dominated by a scientific, systematic set of ideological rules. 
They were still experimenting, and this experimentation was led 
by Fidel Castro, a man incapable of conforming to any set dogmatic 
rules.^ 
Can the atmosphere in Cuba be descri.bed as one of ^coerced 
unanimity"? Do we find operational texror in Cuba as described 
by Friedrich, Brzezinski, and AreMt in their theoretic presen­
tations? The study of Cuba revealed the existence of spy systems 
as implemented through the Committees for tW Defense of the 
Revolution, This case study also deposed tte existence of a 
secret police, the Gg. Also, according to charges presented to 
the Inter-Aaericmi Commission, concentration camps existed in 
Castro's Cuba. Included in reports preswated to the Comission 
were chaises that the Castro regime subjected prisoners to psycho­
logical torture designed to destroy the dignity of the prisoner, 
i 
The description of arbitrary arrests and trial proceedings of 
political prisoners as preswited to the Commission is illustrative 
of Ebenstein's characterization of the status of law within a 
totalitarian regime—law which is always designed to strengthen 
the government, not to protect the citizen. It may, therefore, 
be concluded that the Castro regime did operate in an atmosphere 
of coerced unanimity which allowed neither criticism nor open 
opposition of government programs. 
2lbid. 
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As these preceding paragraphs illustrate, the Castro regime 
did fit the theoretic definition of BTzezinski, The regime aleo 
corresponded to the six traits preaented by both Friedrich and 
Braezinskit an official ideology, a single party led by one man, 
terroristic police control, a centrally directed economy, a 
monopoly of control over the society's communication media, and a 
near-complete weapons monopoly» 
Furthermore, correspondence to the theoretic model is further 
seen when we examine the work presented by Ebenstein» The Cuban 
legal system was illustrative of Ebenstein's description. An 
independent judiciary did not exist in revolutionary Cuba, The 
regime openly declared that the instruments of justice were tools 
of the regime. Cuba's legal codes were applied to maintain and 
protect the operating regime, not to defend the citizen's right 
against assault by the state. In addition, Castro's profession 
of directing a truly democratic government was illustrative of 
Ebenstein's description of the perversion of democratic termin­
ology by totalitarian leaders. Castro maintained that his direct 
contact with the Cuban people through mass meetings was the purest 
form of operating democracy. 
Feierabend's description of a totalitarian society as one 
which cannot tolerate pluralism corresponds geaierally to the 
situation in Cuba, However, the CathoUc Church's operation of 
its religious functions within Castro's Cuba modifiée Feierabend's 
description. As the case study illustrated, the Catholic Church 
was granted a limited degree of autonomy. Finally, Feierabend's 
121 
additional contribution conceming the isolationist and 
expansdonist tendencies of totalitarian regimes is applicable 
to the Cuban situation. Castro's control of coœiunications served 
to isolate the Cuban citizen from outside influences. His direct 
interference in the affairs of other Latin American countries 
and his expx^ssed desire for revolution in Latin America modeled 
after the Cuban experience were certainly illustrative examples 
of expansionist tendencies. 
Arendt's description of the existence of terror within the 
totalitarian regime is applicable to Cut» where the existence of 
spy systems, a secret police, arbitrary arrests, concentration 
camps, and the utilization of psychological terror m.a charged, 
let it must be remembered that a majority of Cubans supported 
Castro, not because of fear hit because of his concrete programs 
for social improvement. 
It may be concluded, finally, that tte situation in Cuba from 
1959 to I96I4 does fit the theoretic model of a totalitarian regime. 
The basic characteristics were present in Cuba. However, in fair­
ness to Castro and his lieutenants, the phrase "Cuba was governed 
by a totalitarian regime" must be modified. The words totalitarian 
regime are softened when one considéré the benefits which such a 
regime brought to Cuba, For the first time in Cuban history, 
the people were governed for an extended time by a government 
which was extremely honest and by men who did not attempt to 
enrich their own pockets at the public expense. For the first time 
in Cuban history the children of the poor were fed, clothed, and 
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eâaeated* No one in Cuba was hungiy. Educational opportunities 
were available to everyone. Government programs were initiated 
to impl^fônt long-range plans to strengthen the country's economy. 
The young leaders made many economic mistakes. Bat, according 
to Herbert Matthews, they learned from these mistakes and their 
economic hopes appeared capable of bearing fruit. 
The Castro regime initiated and directed a complete revolu­
tion—social, economic, and political. The revolution had at 
its base programs designed to improve conditions in Cuba, every­
thing from constructing a concrete home for a peasant who had 
lived in a hut to increasing the gross national product. It is 
obvious that Gastjro chose to implement this revolution with 
totalitailan methods, but one should not lose sight of his 
revolutionaiy goals when evaluating these methods. 
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